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OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL 
Volume 64, Number 6, 2003 
The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement 
in Tax Compliance 
LEANDRA LEDERMAN*
What will increase individuals’ compliance with the federal income tax? 
The traditional answer that increased enforcement will increase compliance 
is supported by both economic modeling and numerous experiments. Some 
scholars have countered that vigorous enforcement of the tax laws may be 
counterproductive because it may suggest that noncompliance is the norm. 
Studies do show that appeals to normative beliefs about honesty in 
taxpaying play an important role. However, enforcement and a compliance 
norm need not be inconsistent; this Article argues that they are actually 
complementary. In other words, enforcement can buttress norms-based 
appeals for compliance. To support this argument, the Article draws on 
empirical evidence from both experimental “games” and field experiments. 
The interplay between enforcement and taxpaying norms manifests itself 
somewhat differently in different contexts. Studies suggest that there is a 
general societal norm of tax compliance in the United States but that, 
among certain groups, there may be a norm of noncompliance. The IRS 
may therefore benefit most from using targeted compliance strategies. With 
respect to mainstream, generally compliant taxpayers, the IRS can rely on 
broad-based matching of information returns with taxpayer returns, low 
levels of audits, and norms-based appeals. With respect to groups with 
norms of noncompliance, the IRS can use enforcement not only for 
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detection and deterrence but also to try to build a critical mass of compliant 
taxpayers and thereby influence the group norm. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Any system of taxation will likely experience some evasion given the 
financial and other incentives not to comply.1 That is, services provided by 
government, particularly the federal government, are generally so removed from 
the payment of taxes that it is hard for individual citizens to see the benefits they 
receive.2 In addition, because most taxes have a redistributive function, many 
citizens will receive less in benefits than they pay in taxes.3 Even those who 
receive net benefits from the payment of taxes might prefer reduced or less costly 
benefits in exchange for lower taxes. Moreover, given the vast masses who 
contribute to the federal fisc, any one individual reasonably can conclude that his 
 
1 See John S. Carroll, How Taxpayers Think About Their Taxes: Frames and Values, in 
WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 43 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (“Personal income taxes are a 
considerable burden, in terms of money, time, and aggravation.”). Fifty-seven percent of the 
people in Carroll’s study, who were middle to upper-income taxpayers, reported understating 
income and/or overstating deductions within the prior three years. Id. at 50.  
This Article focuses on tax evasion rather than legal tax avoidance and unintentional 
errors. Not all noncompliance is intentional, particularly given the complexity of the tax system. 
See Susan B. Long, Commentary on Brian Erard, The Influence of Tax Audits on Reporting 
Behavior, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 115 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (arguing that tax evasion 
may be a “minor source” of noncompliance); see also Susan B. Long & Judyth A. Swingen, 
Taxpayer Compliance: Setting New Agendas for Research, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 637, 649 
(1991). However, studies reporting taxpayers’ assertions of intentional cheating (admittedly 
anecdotal), see infra notes 83–84, as well as data that present a stark contrast between the 
extraordinarily high percentage of income subject to information reporting correctly reported 
and the relatively low percentage of income from self-employment reported, see infra note 30, 
suggest that intentional evasion is an important component of tax underpayment. Of course, the 
line between illegal tax evasion and legal tax avoidance is sometimes blurry. See Michael W. 
Spicer, Civilization at a Discount: The Problem of Tax Evasion, 39 NAT’L TAX J. 13, 13 (1986) 
(“The term ‘avoision’ on occasion has been used to refer to tax avoidance activity of 
questionable legality.”). 
2 See Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive Us Crazy, and 
How We Can Make Them Sane, 16 VA. TAX REV. 155, 171, 181–82 (1996). 
3 Extreme examples involve very wealthy individuals. Consider Ross Perot: 
[D]uring one of the televised U.S. presidential debates in October, 1992, [he] announced 
that he has paid more than $1 billion in taxes over the years. . . . One must wonder how the 
federal government could possibly provide him with $1 billion in services. It seems 
unlikely that he could get his money’s worth even if the government provided him with a 
large home, free clothing and ten meals a day. 
Robert W. McGee, Is Tax Evasion Unethical?, 42 KAN. L. REV. 411, 432–33 n.128 (1994) 
(footnote omitted).  
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or her benefits would not decrease if he or she were not to contribute4—a classic 
free-rider problem.5  
The United States’s federal income tax system depends, to a large degree, on 
“voluntary compliance.”6 It may, therefore, not be surprising that the federal 
income “tax gap”—the portion of federal income taxes due but not paid each 
year7—is estimated to exceed $150 billion.8 The noncompliance this reflects 
stems from a variety of sources, including innocent mistakes, which are not the 
focus of this Article, as well as intentional evasion.9  
 
4 See Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 179. 
5 In the context of public goods, a “free rider” is someone who enjoys the benefits without 
sharing in the costs. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: 
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1139 
(2000). 
6 Of course, for many taxpayers, compliance is not truly voluntary. According to Jerome 
Kurtz, a former Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), a more appropriate term 
is “voluntary compulsion.” George Guttman, The Interplay of Enforcement and Voluntary 
Compliance, 83 TAX NOTES 1683, 1685 (1999).  
IRS compliance strategies may be viewed as falling into three categories: “constraining,” 
which reduce the opportunity to evade and are highly effective; “adversarial,” which rest on 
enforcement and are in line with economic modeling of tax compliance, discussed below, see 
infra text accompanying notes 43–72; and “cooperative,” which may include such things as the 
provision of service to taxpayers and normative appeals. Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance 
and the Reformed IRS, 51 KAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003).  
7 Graeme S. Cooper, Analyzing Corporate Tax Evasion, 50 TAX L. REV. 33, 35 (1994). 
8 The IRS estimated that in 1998, noncompliance with the individual federal income tax 
amounted to $166.4 billion, based on the assumption of constant compliance rates since 1988 
(the last year for which Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) data was 
available). See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., REPORT RELATING TO THE 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AS REQUIRED BY THE IRS REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 
1998 ¶ 124 (Comm. Print 2002), available at LEXIS, 2002 TNT 93-18 [hereinafter, Joint 
Committee Report]. The estimate may not be very accurate, considering the age of the data and 
the difficulty to account for nonfiling in extrapolating from a program that uses only filed 
returns. Cf. Michael J. Graetz & Louis L. Wilde, The Economics of Tax Compliance: Fact and 
Fantasy, 38 NAT’L TAX J. 355, 356 (1985) (“[M]easuring noncompliance is but a secondary use 
of TCMP.”).  
9 Graeme Cooper lists the following components of noncompliance:  
(1) the tax on income from lawful activities that is deliberately not reported to revenue 
authorities—tax evasion; (2) the tax on income from lawful activities where the income is 
unintentionally omitted—taxpayer error; (3) the tax on income from illegal activities—the 
underground economy; (4) amounts of tax due but not paid to the revenue authority on 
reported income—administrative failure; (5) occasionally, tax not paid because the 
taxpayer relies upon the effectiveness of an artificial tax shelter—tax avoidance; and (6) 
the tax not paid because, according to the law as stated, the liability of the taxpayer to pay 
tax on the income is unclear—ambiguity. 
Cooper, supra note 7, at 35–36. This Article focuses on individuals’ intentional evasion of the 
1456 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1453 
 
                                                                                                                  
How can that gap be narrowed?10 A standard answer to any law-enforcement 
problem is to provide incentives for compliance, typically by punishing 
noncompliance.11 Accordingly, the Internal Revenue Code (Code) provides for a 
variety of civil penalties, including a penalty for underpayment of tax.12 In 
addition, both the Code and other statutes provide criminal sanctions for tax 
evasion and other tax crimes.13 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) traditionally 
has relied on audits and the threat of sanctions to collect taxes.14  
However, some have argued that a softer approach might increase tax 
collection.15 Since the late 1990s, the political climate for the IRS generally has 
been one in which hard enforcement is disfavored. With the Internal Revenue 
Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA ‘98),16 Congress tried to 
remake the IRS to render it more service-oriented. RRA ‘98 brought about 
wholesale reform of the IRS, ranging from restructuring the IRS to reflect 
 
federal income tax, which may involve categories (1), (3), and (4).  
10 Some evasion may be efficient because it relates to productive activity that the taxpayer 
would not have undertaken if he had to pay tax on it. See Spicer, supra note 1, at 14. For 
example, a taxpayer might perform odd jobs only if he can keep the full return on his labor from 
that “moonlighting” but might otherwise choose unproductive leisure activities. See Jonathan 
Skinner & Joel Slemrod, An Economic Perspective on Tax Evasion, 38 NAT’L TAX J. 345, 346 
(1985). In addition, a tax evader may be driven to self-insure the risk of detection by working 
more. James Andreoni, Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 
818, 824 (1998). This, in turn, would increase the amount evaded. Id. 
11 See Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical 
Analysis, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 323 (1972) (applying to tax evasion economic model similar to 
Becker’s model); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. 
ECON. 169, 183–84 (1968) (economic model of crime); see also Dan M. Kahan, Signaling or 
Reciprocating? A Response to Eric Posner’s LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 367, 
369 (2002).  
The only way to overcome this [collective action] dilemma is to furnish external 
incentives—either subsidies or penalties—that bring the interests of individuals into 
alignment with those of the groups to which they belong. From criminal law to 
environmental law, from tax fraud to business fraud, from regulation of the professions to 
regulation of the Internet, this is the story that animates American policymaking. 
Id. 
12 See I.R.C. § 6662 (2002) (penalty for, among other things, substantial underpayment of 
tax and negligence or disregard of rules or regulations). 
13 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 7201–207, 7212 (2002); 18 U.S.C. §§ 287, 371, 1001 (2000). 
14 See Charles O. Rossotti, Modernizing America’s Tax Agency, 83 TAX NOTES 1191, 
1195 (1999) (“Historically, the IRS placed great emphasis on direct enforcement revenue, in 
part because it is precisely measurable and in part because it showed an indirect deterrent effect 
that increases compliance.”). 
15 See Lederman, supra note 6 (forthcoming 2003) (citing authorities). 
16 Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 
112 Stat. 685 §§ 1001–9016 [hereinafter RRA ‘98]. 
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taxpayer segments, not geography,17 and a new taxpayer-focused mission 
statement,18 to major procedural reform, including a third Taxpayer Bill of 
Rights.19 Many of the provisions of RRA ‘98 imposed restrictions on the IRS that 
reduced the enforced collection of taxes.20  
The enforcement-focused approach to tax compliance finds support in 
economic modeling of compliance, which focuses on audits and sanctions.21 On 
the other hand, it is often stated in the tax compliance literature that deterrence 
does not explain voluntary compliance levels in the United States or elsewhere.22 
 
17 Id. at § 1001(a). 
18 See IRM 1.1.1.1(1) (02-26-99), available at www.irs.gov/irm (IRS mission is to 
“[p]rovide America’s taxpayers top quality service by helping them understand and meet their 
tax responsibilities and by applying the tax law with integrity and fairness to all.”). 
19 See RRA ‘98 §§ 3001–804. 
20 See RRA ‘98 § 3421 (requiring that all liens, levies, and seizures have supervisor 
approval, effective on July 28, 1998, except that, for collection actions under the automated 
collection system, effective for collection actions initiated after December 31, 2000); I.R.C. 
§ 6334(e)(1) (2002); RRA ‘98 § 3445(a)–(b) (prohibiting IRS seizure of a taxpayer’s home 
without judicial approval); I.R.C. §§ 6320, 6330 (2002); RRA ‘98 § 3401 (“collection due 
process” procedures).  
Other provisions assisted taxpayers in contesting asserted liabilities. Those include a 
section providing for the possibility of a shift of the burden of proof to the IRS in litigated tax 
cases, I.R.C. § 7491 (2002), RRA ‘98 § 3001(a); a more widely applicable set of rules for 
“innocent spouse” relief from joint and several liability, I.R.C. § 6015 (2002), RRA ‘98 § 3201; 
an authorization of $6 million of matching funds for low-income taxpayer clinics (since 
increased to $7 million), I.R.C. § 7526 (2002), RRA ‘98 § 3601; and cessation of both interest 
and certain time-sensitive penalties in cases in which the IRS does not send notice of the 
proposed liability within 12 or 18 months, I.R.C. § 6404(g) (2002), RRA ‘98 § 3305, despite 
the periods of three years and longer contained in the statute of limitations on assessment, I.R.C. 
§ 6501 (2002). 
RRA ‘98 also enacted the so-called “ten deadly sins,” which have been credited with 
reducing IRS employee willingness to collect taxes. See Barton Massey, Uncertainty, ‘Deadly 
Sins’ Sink Morale at IRS, Ex-Official Claims, 85 TAX NOTES 1364, 1364 (1999); Ann Murphy 
and David Higer, The 10 Deadly Sins: A Law With Unintended Consequences, 96 TAX NOTES 
871, 873 (2002). 
21 See infra text accompanying notes 43–72. 
22 See, e.g., James Alm, Isabel Sanchez & Ana de Juan, Economic and Noneconomic 
Factors in Tax Compliance, 48 KYKLOS 3, 3 (1995) (“[T]he puzzle of tax compliance is not so 
much ‘Why is there so much cheating?’ Instead, the real puzzle is ‘Why is there so little 
cheating?’ ”); Robert Cooter & Melvin A. Eisenberg, Norms & Corporate Law: Fairness, 
Character, and Efficiency in Firms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1717, 1725 (2001) (“[T]he punishment 
for tax evasion in most countries, discounted by the probability of prosecution and conviction, 
is small relative to the gain. Whereas economic models of self-interest predict low rates of tax 
compliance, some countries, like the U.S. and Switzerland, enjoy high rates of tax 
compliance.”); Kahan, supra note 11, at 377 (“Tax compliance rates—which vary dramatically 
across nations—seem to bear no connection to enforcement levels. For example, tax cheats face 
a much higher expected penalty in many European nations than they do in the United States, yet 
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That is because only a small percentage of taxpayers are audited,23 not every 
evader who is audited will be caught,24 some evasion detected will not be pursued 
by the government (particularly criminally),25 and some penalties will not be 
 
the United States enjoys a higher compliance rate.”); Eric Posner, Law and Social Norms: The 
Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781, 1782 (2000) (“A widespread view among tax 
scholars holds that law enforcement does not explain why people pay taxes.”); see infra note 
29.
23 In fiscal year 2000, the overall audit rate for individuals was .49%. I.R.S. Releases 
Audit and Collection Activity Statistics for FY 2000, at ¶ 16 (Feb. 15, 2001), available at 
LEXIS, 2001 TNT 33-11. For individuals with $100,000 or more of income it was .96%. Id. 
Each of these audit rates declined every year between 1996 and 2000. See id. The IRS did not 
report similar information in its 2001 collection activity statistics. See generally I.R.S. Releases 
Audit and Collection Activity Statistics for FY 2001 (Feb. 28, 2002), available at LEXIS, 2002 
TNT 41-10. If a wider variety of IRS contacts with taxpayers were counted as audits, the 
numbers would increase substantially but would remain low. For example, the overall audit rate 
for 1999 would increase from .89% to 3.8%. See George Guttman, Current Audit Statistics 
Make IRS Look Less Effective Than It Is, 90 TAX NOTES 1593, 1597 tbl.4 (2001); see also GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RATE FOR INDIVIDUAL TAXPAYERS HAS DECLINED BUT EFFECT ON 
COMPLIANCE IS UNKNOWN, GAO-01-484, at 14 (April 2001), available at LEXIS, 2001 TNT 
105-31 at ¶ 39 (“Since the math error and under reporter checks can be similar to 
correspondence audits, growth in these programs may offset to some degree the decline in the 
audit rate.”). 
24 See Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 189 (“Even if the Service does audit the taxpayer, it 
may not notice whatever tax evasion the taxpayer may have engaged in. To the extent that it 
must rely on the taxpayer’s own records to incriminate the taxpayer, the Service is in a difficult 
position.”). 
25 For example, in 1981, fewer than .1% of IRS investigations and audits were prosecuted 
criminally. Skinner & Slemrod, supra note 10, at 348. With respect to both tax and other 
financial crimes, in the aggregate, the IRS initiated a total of 3372 investigations in fiscal year 
2000, 3284 in fiscal year 2001, and 3906 in fiscal year 2002. The total number of convictions 
for those years was 2249, 2251, and 1926, respectively, though, because prosecutions span 
multiple years, those figures do not necessarily reflect the same pool of taxpayers. See Criminal 
Investigation Program, by Status or Disposition, FY 2002, at 
http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/0,,id=107483,00.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2003); 2001 Internal 
Revenue Service Data Book, tbl.18 & n.4, at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/01databk.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2003); 2000 Internal Revenue Service Data Book, tbl.18 and n.4, at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/00databk.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2003). Prosecutions for legal-
source tax crimes were a fraction of the total, amounting to 1554 investigations initiated in 
fiscal year 2002 and a total of 522 convictions in that year, for example. See Criminal 
Investigation Program, by Status or Disposition, FY 2002, supra. 
These figures pale in comparison to individual income tax returns filed, which amounted 
to approximately 127.6 million for fiscal year 2000, 129.8 million for fiscal year 2001, and 
were estimated by the IRS to be 132.7 million for calendar year 2002. See Summary of Number 
of Returns, by Type of Return, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001 (2002), at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/01db02nr.xls (last visited Oct. 24, 2003); Projections of Returns 
to be Filed in Calendar Years 2001–2008, 174 (2002), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/08rs01pr.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2003).  
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upheld.26 From this perspective, the expected sanction of any particular tax 
evader is tiny, yet voluntary compliance with the federal income tax generally is 
estimated to be around eighty-three percent.27 This apparent discrepancy has 
suggested to a number of scholars that other factors are at play in determining tax 
compliance, including social norms28 of compliance.29  
 
A criminal tax case, like other criminal prosecutions, requires proof of intent (in tax cases, 
“willfulness”) at a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of proof. This is particularly difficult 
in tax cases, given the nature of the behavior involved. See Graetz & Wilde, supra note 8, at 
358. That is, it is difficult for authorities to distinguish tax evasion from honest error. Skinner & 
Slemrod, supra note 10, at 349. This renders the application of criminal laws to tax evasion 
very difficult. Id.  
26 Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein, supra note 10, at 821 (explaining that, in 1995, only 4.1% 
of those audited were penalized). 
27 See id. at 819.  
28 “[S]ocial norms . . . [are] social attitudes that specify what behaviors an actor ought to 
exhibit.” Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 5, at 1127.  
 Scholars generally define social norms as nonlegal rules or obligations that certain 
individuals feel compelled to follow despite the lack of formal legal sanctions, whether 
because defiance would subject them to sanctions from others (typically in the form of 
disapproval, lowered esteem, or even ostracism) or because they would feel guilty for 
failing to conform to the norm (a so-called internalized norm). Put more positively, norms 
are nonlegal rules that certain individuals follow because they gain from doing so, either 
through increased inner satisfaction from doing the right thing or through approval they 
garner from others. 
Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1238–39 (2001) (footnotes omitted).  
29 See Richard C. Stark, A Principled Approach to Collection and Accuracy-Related 
Penalties, 91 TAX NOTES 115, 121–22 (2001).  
[T]axpayers’ feelings that they “should” comply with the tax law because it is “right[]” . . . 
doubtless have many sources, including generalized support for our system of government, 
agreement with the way in which federal revenues are spent, general feelings of moral 
responsibility, positive feelings regarding the legitimacy of the IRS, and positive feelings 
regarding the fairness of the way in which the federal government in general and the IRS 
in particular treat taxpayers. The existence and imposition of both criminal and civil 
sanctions probably also contribute to feelings regarding the “rightness” of compliance. 
Id. (footnotes omitted); see supra note 22; see also James Alm, Betty Jackson & Michael 
McKee, Deterrence and Beyond: Toward a Kinder, Gentler IRS, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 
311, 313 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992).  
It is . . . important to recognize that detection and punishment cannot explain the 
compliance behavior of all individuals. The percentage of tax returns that are subject to 
detailed audit is quite small in most countries, and penalties are seldom more than a 
fraction of unpaid taxes. . . . However, compliance in many countries remains relatively 
high. Additional factors must play a role—perhaps a dominant one—in tax compliance.  
Alm, Jackson, & McKee, supra, at 313. (footnotes omitted); Joseph Bankman & Thomas 
Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look At Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. 
L. REV. 1905, 1942 n.169 (1987) (asserting that “[i]t seems reasonable” to attribute some 
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 In fact, the eighty-three percent figure is misleading because it is an 
aggregate comprised of differing levels of compliance that correspond to 
differences in opportunity to evade tax.30 Economic modeling of tax compliance, 
which focuses on deterrence, has more explanatory power when it is applied more 
precisely to the probability of detection of evasion31 with respect to a particular 
source of income, for example, and compared to the voluntary reporting 
percentage for that type of income.32 However, deterrence does not seem to 
explain all tax compliance33 and there is empirical evidence that compliance 
norms play a role.34 
 
compliance unexplained by the economic model to such things as the “moral and social costs of 
dishonesty and the transaction costs of enduring an audit”).  
30 See Lederman, supra note 6 (forthcoming 2003); JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, 
TAXING OURSELVES 150 (1996).  
 As you would expect, the less chance of getting caught, the more likely people are to 
try to get away with tax evasion. This is borne out by the data in Table 5.1, which presents 
information from the 1987 tax gap study about what percentage of several types of income 
are actually reported by individuals. It ranges from 99.5 percent for wages and salaries, 
taxes on which are difficult to evade successfully, down to 41.4 percent for self-
employment income. 
Id. 
31 This, in turn, needs to account for more IRS contacts than those formally denominated 
“audits.” See Guttman, supra note 23, at 1597 tbl.4. 
32 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA supra note 30 (contrasting compliance levels with respect to 
applicability of information reporting).  
Information reporting alone does not explain all tax compliance. See Andreoni, Erard & 
Feinstein, supra note 10, at 822 (stating that, for 1992, 91.7% of all reportable income was 
reported, although only three-fourths of income was subject to information reporting). 
33 See, e.g., KRISTINA MURPHY & KAREN BYNG, PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM THE 
AUSTRALIAN TAX SYSTEM SURVEY OF SCHEME INVESTORS 24 (Austl. Nat’l Univ., Res. Sch. of 
Soc. Sci., Ctr. for Tax Sys. Integrity, 2002), available at http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/UP.Murphy 
surveyfindings.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2003). 
 When taken together, the findings from Section 6 of the Investors’ Survey suggest 
that a regulatory strategy based purely on deterrence (monetary fines or probability of 
detection) may go someway to preventing tax avoidance, but it is unlikely to be the most 
effective strategy for general compliance among all taxpayers. Instead, the findings 
suggest that taxpayer’s attitudes and reactions to their wrong-doing (i.e., their shame 
responses), in addition to economic calculations or fear of punishment, need to be 
considered when designing an effective regulatory strategy. 
Id. 
34 See Stephen Coleman, The Minnesota Income Tax Compliance Experiment: State Tax 
Results, Minnesota Department of Revenue (Apr. 1996), available at http://www.taxes.state. 
mn.us/taxes/legal_policy/research_reports/content/complnce.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2003); 
MICHAEL WENZEL, MISPERCEPTIONS OF SOCIAL NORMS ABOUT TAX COMPLIANCE (2): A 
FIELD-EXPERIMENT (Austl. Nat’l Univ., Austl. Taxation Office, Ctr. for Tax Sys. Integrity, 
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The evidence that norms affect tax compliance is supported by research that 
has demonstrated that individuals tend to reciprocate or cooperate35 with others 
even under circumstances in which narrow self-interest would suggest that they 
would not. For example, people tend to contribute to public goods when they 
perceive that others contribute, even though they would maximize their own 
return by not contributing.36 In laboratory experiments, this phenomenon holds 
even in anonymous play where the opportunity to signal does not exist.37  
The cooperation phenomenon has suggested to some commentators that 
sanctions may actually be counterproductive—they may undermine 
compliance.38 They argue that sanctions may decrease cooperation because the 
incentives provide less opportunity for individuals to engage in (or observe others 
engaging in) voluntary cooperation39 or because punishments suggest that others 
 
Working Paper No. 8, 2001), available at http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/WP8.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 
2003); see also infra notes 89–114 and accompanying text. 
35 Much of the literature uses the term “reciprocation” to refer to both cooperative 
behavior between two individuals and collaboration in a group endeavor. These are not exactly 
the same thing. Cf. Robert B. Cialdini, Social Motivations to Comply: Norms, Values, and 
Principles, in 2 TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE 200, 211–14 (Jeffrey A. Roth & John T. Scholz, eds. 
1989) (separately discussing reciprocation and social validation).  
36 See generally Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333 
(2001) (citing and discussing some of this research).  
37 See infra note 126 and accompanying text. 
38 See, e.g., Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of 
Reciprocity, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2000, at 159–181. 
A study of Israeli daycare centers arguably supports this hypothesis. That study found that 
introducing a small, flat, per-child fine for parent lateness in picking up children increased the 
instances of lateness. See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 
1 (2000). However, the context of that study differs from that of tax compliance in important 
ways. As the authors posit, the imposition of a fine by the daycare centers suggested that a fine 
is the worst consequence for lateness. See id. at 10. The fine was also relatively low (a flat ten 
New Israeli Shekels (NIS) per child for each day on which the parent arrived ten minutes or 
more late). Id. at 5. For purposes of comparison, the authors noted that a babysitter earned 
between NIS 15 and NIS 20 per hour and the average monthly salary in Israel at the time was 
NIS 5,595. Id. The monthly daycare fee per child was NIS 1,400 (approximately $380). Id. at 4. 
A study of high occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes provides contrary evidence. It found that 
allowing solo drivers to use the HOV lanes for a fee (that is, by paying a toll electronically via 
an “ExpressPass”) both decreased unauthorized use of the HOV lanes and increased carpooling. 
See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms: 
Commodifying California's Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 1231, 1234 (2000). Based on data that 
showed that “the new carpools consisted mostly of drivers who had neither used an 
ExpressPass nor participated in a carpool during the previous year,” Professor Strahilevitz 
hypothesizes that “[b]y supplementing the time savings that HOV users obtain by riding in 
HOV lanes with a quantifiable monetary saving that they get relative to solo drivers, carpooling 
became a more attractive option.” Id. at 1256. 
39 See Kahan, supra note 36, at 338 (“Material incentives can . . . mask reciprocal 
cooperation.”). In other words, rewards or punishments may crowd out a moral compunction to 
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do not cooperate,40 thereby undermining any cooperation norm.  
This is an important question because the direct revenue from enforcement is 
a tiny fraction of the revenue from voluntary compliance.41 Key to increasing 
compliance, therefore, is the question of whether increased enforcement increases 
voluntary compliance or decreases it.  
This Article argues that enforcement not only does not undermine a 
compliance norm, but in fact may help foster and maintain such a norm. The 
Article also suggests strategies that the recently restructured IRS can use to 
increase compliance.42 
The Article has three principal parts. Part II focuses on the traditional 
adversarial approach to tax collection, which rests on an economic model of law 
enforcement. Under economic modeling of tax compliance, audit rates and 
sanctions are critical to compliance. 
Part III of the Article considers the role of norms in tax compliance. First, it 
discusses the empirical evidence that norms-based appeals influence taxpayer 
compliance. Next, this Part considers possible sources of compliance norms. 
Section A discusses experimental evidence about cooperation and reciprocity. 
Section B links Parts II and III by considering the interaction of enforcement and 
norms. That Section argues that enforcement can help sustain norms of 
compliance. 
Part IV considers the application of the interaction of enforcement and norms 
to taxpayer segments. Section A argues that a norms-based appeal might be cost-
effective with respect to taxpayers with primarily wage and investment income. 
Section B analyzes the difficult problem of evasion by owners of cash-based 
businesses, which includes a competitiveness aspect that can be analyzed as a 
 
pay taxes. See Kahan, supra note 36, at 338, BRUNO S. FREY & LARS P. FELD, DETERRENCE 
AND MORALE IN TAXATION: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 8 (CESIFO, Working Paper No. 760, 
2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=341380 (last visited Oct. 24, 2003). 
40 See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 36, at 338 (“The simple existence of an incentive scheme 
can signal that other individuals are not inclined to cooperate voluntarily: if they were, 
incentives would be unnecessary. This inference can in turn trigger a reciprocal disposition to 
withhold voluntary cooperation, thereby undercutting, if not wholly displacing, the force of the 
incentive.”); see also Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing, 
90 CAL. L. REV. 1513, 1519 (2002) (making the same argument in another context); cf. 
Cialdini, supra note 35, at 215 (“If taxpayers believe there is a significant minority of tax 
cheaters, they may be inclined to cheat as well because the act would have acquired some social 
validation.”). 
41 Enforcement revenue as a percentage of total revenue after refunds was 2.47% in fiscal 
year 1997, 2.14% in 1998, 1.88% in 1999 and 1.78% in both 2000 and 2001. See Delinquent 
Collection Activities Reports, Fiscal Years 2001 and 2002 (Mar. 2003), at 
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=97168,00.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2003) (percentages 
calculated by the author). 
42 A related article considers the likely impact of the “reformed” IRS on compliance. See 
generally Lederman, supra note 6 (forthcoming 2003). 
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prisoner’s dilemma. Section B argues that additional enforcement with respect to 
groups of self-employed taxpayers might succeed in tipping the norm from 
noncompliance to compliance. 
The Article concludes that the threat of enforcement can work hand in hand 
with the fostering of compliance norms, by assuring compliant taxpayers that 
others are likely to comply. In fact, because different types of taxpayers are 
differently situated with respect to compliance, some may be more responsive to 
the deterrent threat of audits while others may be more responsive to normative 
appeals.  
II. THE ECONOMICS OF TAX COMPLIANCE 
Economic models of tax compliance essentially consider tax evasion “a 
special form of gambling.”43 The basic model of tax compliance is based on an 
economic model of crime advanced by Gary Becker.44 In the model, developed 
by Michael Allingham and Agnar Sandmo, tax compliance depends on the 
probability of detection and the punishment if cheating is detected.45 In other 
words, the model predicts that a rational taxpayer will evade taxes if the expected 
value of the punishment is lower than the expected gains from evasion.46  
 
43 Spicer, supra note 1, at 14. 
44 See Frey & Feld, supra note 39, at 2 (citing Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An 
Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968)). 
45 See Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 11, at 323. The model treats income as 
exogenous. See Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein, supra note 10, at 823. Articles subsequent to 
Allingham and Sandmo have made income endogenous by adding labor supply. See id. at 824 
(citing articles). The predictions of this model are ambiguous because they depend on the shape 
of the labor supply curve. Id. 
In the model, if the taxpayer avoids an audit, he will retain the undeclared taxes. If he is 
audited and sanctioned, he will lose a multiple that is greater than 1 of the undeclared taxes 
(such as 120% of the undeclared taxes if the fine is 20% of those taxes).  
46 The model can be written as EU = (1 - p) u (y + x) + pu (y - Fx) where EU is the 
expected utility, u is the utility function, p is the probability of audit (with assumed detection 
and sanction), y is the legal after-tax income, x is the amount of undeclared taxes, and F is the 
penalty applicable to the unpaid taxes. If expected utility is positive, a rational utility maximizer 
should cheat. This is the version of the model used in other articles, see Bankman & Griffith, 
supra note 29, at 1942 n.169 (citation omitted); Skinner & Slemrod, supra note 10, at 347, 
except that F is simply the penalty, not the penalty plus one, see Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein, 
supra note 10, at 823 (using a similar model, with 2z as the term, where 2 is the penalty rate and 
z is the amount of income understated). Of course, if caught, the taxpayer has to pay the unpaid 
tax as well as the penalty. However, the equation already captures the unpaid tax because it 
considers its retention as an increase in wealth; counting its payment (if caught) as a decrease in 
wealth would be double counting. Therefore, Professors Bankman and Griffith’s statement that 
“[a]t a detection rate equal to the 2% average audit rate, and a constant marginal utility of 
money, the model predicts evasion whenever the penalty rate is less than 5000% of the tax due” 
is misleading; in fact, the penalty rate would have to be 4900% of the tax due so that the total 
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As a simplified example,47 assume that a taxpayer is facing a decision 
whether or not to report $3,000 of income received in cash. Assume that the 
applicable tax rate is 33 1/3% so that the tax at stake is $1,000. Also assume that 
if the taxpayer is caught, the taxpayer will owe a penalty of $3,000 plus the tax 
that was legally due. (Assume for simplicity that all amounts are adjusted to 
current dollars.) If there is a 2% chance that a taxpayer will be audited48 and a 
100% chance that, if audited, the taxpayer will owe the $3,000 penalty,49 the 
expected penalty for noncompliance is only $60,50 while the expected benefit of 
 
amount paid would be 5000% of the tax due. Bankman & Griffith, supra note 29, at 1942 n.169 
(citation omitted). 
The model has many simplifying assumptions. It involves a single decision in one time 
period to report or evade with respect to a particular amount of income. The audit rate is 
exogenous and greater than zero but less than one. See Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein, supra note 
10, at 823. The amount of income is exogenous, as well, and is known to the taxpayer but not 
the government. See id. The model also assumes that the taxpayer is risk-averse. See id. That is, 
marginal utility is positive and decreasing. See Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 11, at 324. Of 
course, the model implicitly assumes that the taxpayer is a rational wealth-maximizer. See 
Kahan, supra note 11, at 369. The model also implicitly assumes that the audit rate is known to 
the taxpayer. The model is easily adapted, however, by using the audit rate perceived by the 
taxpayer (which may differ from the actual rate). Taxpayers’ overestimation of the probability 
of detection and sanction may explain some compliance. See Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein, 
supra note 10, at 846. In addition, “people consistently overestimate the probability of an 
outcome which can occur only as the result of a particular series of events” (the so-called 
“conjunction effect”). Jeff T. Casey & John T. Scholz, Beyond Deterrence: Behavioral 
Decision Theory and Tax Compliance, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 821, 833 (1991). 
47 The more sophisticated economic model considers the level of legal after-tax income 
and the utility function. See supra note 46. The use of expected utility allows for, among other 
things, the declining marginal utility of money. See Casey & Scholz, supra note 46, at 823–24. 
48 In fact, the average audit rate for individuals is now around half of one percent. See 
Examination Coverage: Recommended and Average Recommended Additional Tax After 
Examination, by Type and Size of Return, Fiscal Year 2002, tbl.10, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/02db10ex.xls (last visited Oct. 24, 2003) (overall audit rate for 
individuals was .57% in fiscal year 2002). However, that figure reflects a blend of audit rates 
that differ among taxpayer groups sorted by such things as amount of income. See id.  
49 This assumption is unrealistic because audits cannot detect all evasion, and penalties are 
not asserted in all cases. See Stark, supra note 29, at 119. 
[I]n 1998 the IRS made a total of perhaps 5.4 million contacts regarding whether 
information reported on returns was correct. During the same period, the total number of 
negligence and fraud penalties actually assessed by the IRS was only 7,343, or a little less 
than 0.15 percent of this total, and of these, a substantial number were abated. . . . Put 
another way, in 1998 the IRS proposed a nonfraud accuracy penalty once for every 
100,000 returns filed and about once for every 1,000 returns examined. At the same time, 
it abated about 7½ previously assessed accuracy-related penalties for every 100,000 
returns filed and about 8½ such penalties for every 1,000 returns audited. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
50 The actual payment would be $4,000 ($3,000 penalty plus the $1,000 tax) but the 
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noncompliance is $980 (reflecting a 98% chance of retaining the unpaid 
$1,000).51 In other words, the expected value of cheating is $920,52 and rationally 
the taxpayer should cheat whenever the expected value is positive.  
As this example suggests, economic models of tax compliance counsel that 
increased audit rates and/or sanctions will increase compliance and, in fact, 
counsel extremely high sanctions at low rates of audit. For example, with a 2% 
rate of audit for individuals (which is unrealistically high at present),53 for 
compliance to be rational, the penalty that an individual taxpayer would owe if 
caught would have to be at least $49,000 (2% of $49,000 is $980). That is, if the 
taxpayer would owe a $49,000 penalty if caught, then the expected value of 
failing to report and pay the $1,000 tax would be zero.54 In other words, at a 2% 
audit rate, a $49,000 penalty equalizes the cost of compliance ($1,000) and the 
expected cost of failing to comply (2% of $50,000, that is, of $49,000 plus 
$1,000).55 Similarly, an audit rate of 1% would require a $99,000 penalty in this 
example.56 
Under the economic model, the most efficient action by the government is to 
set penalties for tax evasion extremely high.57 The model suggests that the 
government could achieve the same result by increasing the audit rate or 
thoroughness of audits. However, that is more costly than increasing the 
magnitude of the penalty.58 And, in fact, increased audits and increased sanctions 
 
$1,000 tax cannot be reflected in the equation because the baseline is compliance. That is, if the 
taxpayer does not comply, the taxpayer faces a 98% chance of increasing his wealth from the 
compliance baseline by $1,000, and a 2% chance of decreasing his wealth from the compliance 
baseline (which already reflects payment of the $1,000) by an additional $3,000. See supra note 
46. But cf. Casey & Scholz, supra note 46, at 823 (including payment of the tax itself in the 
calculation of expected value and therefore finding that, at a 33.3% rate of audit and sanction, 
the penalty need only be 100% of the tax, not 200%). 
51 That is, compliance is treated as the baseline. See Casey & Scholz, supra note 46, at 
823. In other words, the expected value of cheating accounts both for the probability that the 
taxpayer will experience an increase in wealth if he does not get caught and the probability he 
will experience a decrease in wealth if he does get caught. 
52 $980 - $60. 
53 See supra note 48. 
54 .98 ($1,000) - .02 ($49,000) = 0.  
55 What if there were only a 70% chance that if audited, the evasion will be caught? In that 
case, the expected cost of noncompliance would be only $42. If the likelihood that a penalty 
will be imposed is less than 100% or the likelihood that the tax and penalty will actually be 
collected is less than 100%, then the $42 expected cost of noncompliance would be even less. 
56 That is, if caught evading $1,000 of taxes, the taxpayer would owe the $1,000 of unpaid 
taxes plus a $99,000 penalty. One percent of $100,000 is $1,000. 
57 See Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein, supra note 10, at 823–24. 
58 See C. EUGENE STEUERLE, WHO SHOULD PAY FOR COLLECTING TAXES?: FINANCING 
THE IRS 52–53 (1986); Skinner & Slemrod, supra note 10, at 346.  
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probably are not substitutes in the linear way implied by the model.59 That is, 
people may be disproportionately deterred by high sanctions.60 For example, a 
government policy of hanging tax evaders might be the most effective deterrent, 
at least initially, even if the audit rate were minuscule.61 However, the 
government probably would not enforce such an extreme penalty62 for many 
reasons, including equity between evaders caught and those not caught.63 A 
draconian penalty also would likely deter some legal, productive activity that is 
close to the line between legal avoidance and illegal evasion.64  
In fact, it is not politically realistic for the government to impose even 
extremely high monetary penalties for tax evasion65 and the government does not 
do so.66 Although the amount owed the IRS, given penalties and interest, can be 
daunting for many taxpayers, the amounts in question are far less than the 
amounts that the economic model suggests would be needed to make tax evasion 
irrational.67 Thus, in the real world, the economic model counsels enforcement at 
a level high enough to deter cheating, even if it would theoretically be cheaper 
 
59 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between the 
Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 880, 880–81 (1979).  
60 See Cooper, supra note 7, at 56 and n.82 (citing studies). 
61 See id. at 57. In China, for example, tax evasion is a capital offense. See Michael 
Dwyer, Tax Fraud? Execute Them, Says China, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Jan. 7, 2002, at 9. 
62 See Richard D. Schwartz & Sonya Orleans, On Legal Sanctions, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 
274, 277–78 (1966–67) (providing examples); Dwyer, supra note 61, at 9. 
63 See Skinner & Slemrod, supra note 10, at 349; see also STEUERLE, supra note 58, at 53 
(pointing out that equity requires that the “punishment fit the crime” and that many taxpayers 
believe that minor noncompliance is widespread and not particularly serious). 
64 Cf. Anne Marie Herron, The Antitrust Sentencing Guideline: Deterring Crime by 
Clarifying the Volume of Commerce Muddle, 51 EMORY L.J. 929, 959 (2002) (“Looking at 
deterrence more generally, in the case of antitrust violations, the risks of overdeterrence relate to 
the types of legal, efficient conduct that might be precluded by imposing excessive sanctions.”). 
65 See Graetz & Wilde, supra note 8, at 358.  
That an economic model of analyzing the expected utility calculation of a would-be tax 
evader recommends large increases in the applicable sanction in light of the very low 
probability of its application quickly becomes irrelevant as a policy matter. In this country, 
at least, legal, moral, and political constraints make this necessarily so.  
Id. 
66 See Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein, supra note 10, at 824; Arindam Das-Gupta & Dilip 
Mookherjee, Tax Amnesties as Asset-Laundering Devices, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 408, 408 
(1996) (“In practice, penalties for most [tax] offenses tend to be nonmaximal.”).  
67 See IRS Releases Audit and Collection Activity Statistics for FY 2001, supra note 23 
(“The risk of not paying taxes carries tremendous risks. Penalties and interest—especially when 
compounded over several years—pile up quickly and create a devastating bill for families. In 
1999, the average tax and penalty for the simplest kind of Service Center audit was $2,602.”). 
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simply to raise penalties substantially. 
The basic tax compliance model described above has been refined in various 
ways. For example, individual taxpayers may not be certain of the audit rate or 
even of the amount of taxes they will owe on a particular amount of income.68 In 
the face of uncertainty, individuals tend to rely on heuristics that may result in 
non-maximizing strategies.69 Thus, a lack of precise information about the 
likelihood of audit may increase compliance when audit rates and penalties are 
low.70  
Perhaps more important, the basic model treats the audit rate as exogenously 
determined, but in fact a taxpayer’s likelihood of audit varies depending on what 
the taxpayer reports. Among other techniques, the IRS uses a secret formula with 
a multitude of variables that is designed to optimize the selection of returns for 
audit.71 Some models treat the audit rate as endogenous.72 
Although these models can be used to examine the effects of a variety of 
variables on evasion,73 a consistent theme is that economic modeling counsels 
increasing audit rates and/or sanctions to increase tax compliance. A number of 
studies have found higher levels of compliance at higher audit rates or sanction 
levels.74 Nonetheless, it is clear that economic modeling does not capture all of 
 
68 See Robert M. Melia, Is the Pen Mightier Than the Audit?, 34 TAX NOTES 1309, 1310 
(1987).  
69 See Spicer, supra note 1, at 15–16. 
70 Nehemiah Friedland, A Note on Tax Evasion as a Function of the Quality of 
Information About the Magnitude and Credibility of Threatened Fines: Some Preliminary 
Research, 12 J. OF APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 54, 59 (1982). 
71 See generally GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IRS’ RETURN SELECTION PROCESS, 
GAO/GGD-99-30 (Feb. 1999), available at LEXIS, 1999 TNT 36-14; see also Andreoni, 
Erard & Feinstein, supra note 10, at 825; James Alm & Michael McKee, Tax 
Compliance as a Coordination Game 2 (Andrew Young Sch. of Policy Studies, Working 
Paper, 2000), available at http://www.gsu.edu/~wwwsps/publications/2000/000701_ 
taxcompliance.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2003). 
72 See Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein, supra note 10, at 824–31 (discussing two variations 
on the model, one in which the tax authority pre-commits to an audit rule and one in which it 
does not). That discussion focuses on the implications for optimal audit strategy. See id. The 
effect of audits and penalties in these game-theoretic models is difficult to determine because of 
the endogeneity of risk of audit. See id. at 841. Experiments that have addressed that issue by 
using simulations have found that increased penalties and increased audits each have a positive 
impact on compliance. Id. 
73 For example, Allingham and Sandmo developed their model, which includes a term for 
the tax rate, in order to consider the effects of tax rates on compliance. See Allingham & 
Sandmo, supra note 11; see also Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein, supra note 10, at 823.  
74 See, e.g., Alm, Jackson & McKee, supra note 29, at 321 (making both findings, in an 
experimental setting); Friedland, supra note 70, at 55–59; Nehemiah Friedland, Schlomo Maital 
& Aryeh Rutenberg, A Simulation Study of Income Tax Evasion, 10 J. PUBLIC ECON. 107, 113 
(1978) (“Large fines are more effective deterrents than small ones, even when audit frequencies 
1468 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1453 
 
                                                                                                                  
the many factors that affect tax compliance75 or explain all compliance.76 The 
role of norms of compliance or noncompliance is discussed in the next Part. 
III. THE ROLE OF NORMS IN TAX COMPLIANCE 
Laws and law-enforcement certainly are not the only determinants of 
behavior.77 With respect to tax compliance, empirical evidence supports the role 
 
are reduced proportionately.”). A meta-analysis of numerous studies found that higher audit 
rates increase compliance, as does higher penalty rates. CALVIN BLACKWELL, A META-
ANALYSIS OF TAX COMPLIANCE EXPERIMENTS (Coll. of Charleston, Working Paper, 2002).  
75 See generally Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein, supra note 10 (discussing importance of 
such factors as taxpayer’s age and marital status and influence of tax practitioners). 
76 See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. Fairness of procedures used by the tax 
collector also seems to impact compliance. See Lederman, supra note 6 (forthcoming 2003) 
(discussing literature); KRISTINA MURPHY, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE AND THE AUSTRALIAN 
TAXATION OFFICE: A STUDY OF TAX SCHEME INVESTORS 20 (Austl. Nat’l Univ., Austl. 
Taxation Office, Ctr. for Tax Sys. Integrity, Working Paper No. 8, 2001), available at 
http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/UP.Murphy.procedural.doc (last visited Oct. 24, 2003) (stating, with 
respect to survey study of small group of “tax scheme” investors, “[t]hus, the reaction of so 
many investors to defy the ATO’s [Australian Taxation Office’s] request that they pay back 
taxes appears, in part, to be one of protest at being branded a tax cheat”). 
77 See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 338, 391–408 (1997) (discussing the interaction of law and norms). 
As a starting point for other explanations of tax compliance, such as taxpayer morale, trust 
in government, and the role of norms, a number of scholars have stated that the standard 
economic model does not explain the estimated overall level of compliance with the federal 
income tax. See supra note 22; see also Bankman & Griffith, supra note 29, at 1942 & n.169 
(asserting that “[i]t seems reasonable” to attribute some compliance unexplained by the 
economic model to such things as the “moral and social costs of dishonesty and the transaction 
costs of enduring an audit”). That is, the audit rate is currently under 1% for individuals, and has 
been under 2% for a number of years. Internal Revenue Service Progress Report from the 
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service 43 (Dec. 2001), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/pub3970_2-2002.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2003) [hereinafter, 
“IRS Progress Report”]. The audit rate for individuals was 1.67% in 1995, 1.67% in 1996, 
1.28% in 1997, .99% in 1998, .90% in 1999, .49% in 2000, and .58% in 2001. Id. Under the 
economic model discussed above, a 1% audit rate calls for penalties of 99 times the tax. Yet, the 
sanction for most underpayments of tax is a 20% penalty for negligence or substantial 
understatement of tax, plus payment of the tax itself and interest. See I.R.C. § 6662 (2002). The 
penalty for fraud is 75% of the tax, I.R.C. § 6663(a) (2002), but that requires the IRS to prove 
fraud by clear and convincing evidence, see I.R.C. § 7454 (2002); Smith v. Commissioner, 926 
F.2d 1470, 1475 (6th Cir. 1991); Tax Court Rule 142(b), whereas normally the taxpayer bears 
the burden of persuasion, see Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933); Tax Court Rule 
142(a). Criminal sanctions are imposed only extremely rarely. For example, in 1981, fewer than 
.1% of IRS investigations and audits were pursued criminally. Skinner & Slemrod, supra note 
10, at 348. In addition, it is unlikely that audits detect all underpayments of tax, and penalties 
are not asserted in every case. See supra note 10, at 821. This analysis is misleading because it 
ignores the role of information reporting and withholding in constraining taxpayer compliance 
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of other factors, particularly the influence that other members of society have. For 
example, a study of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 found that “those who 
encountered others who expressed positive attitudes toward the Tax Reform Act 
displayed greater commitment to complying with it themselves, whereas those 
who encountered others who expressed negative attitudes displayed less 
commitment.”78 Similarly, “[o]ne of the most consistent findings in survey 
research about taxpayer attitudes and behaviors is that those who report 
compliance believe that their friends (and taxpayers in general) comply, whereas 
those who report cheating believe that others cheat.”79  
Of course, that insight does not reveal whether taxpayers who report that they 
do not cheat do so because they believe others do not cheat, or the reverse,80 and 
even whether taxpayers who state that they do or do not cheat are honest in those 
assertions.81 However, there are psychological explanations for why the 
 
behavior. See Lederman, supra note 6 (forthcoming 2003).  
78 Kahan, supra note 36, at 341 (citing Marco R. Steenbergen et al., Taxpayer Adaptation 
to the 1986 Tax Reform Act: Do New Tax Laws Affect the Way Taxpayers Think About Taxes?, 
in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 29–30 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992)); see also Schwartz & Orleans, 
supra note 62, at 296–99 (discussing their survey that focused on moral reasons to pay taxes). 
People also may be more compliant with a tax system that they believe is fair. See Carroll, 
supra note 1, at 47; Kent W. Smith, Reciprocity and Fairness: Positive Incentives for Tax 
Compliance, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 223, 244 fig.2, 245 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992); 
Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein, supra note 10, at 851 (discussing literature). But cf. Robert Mason 
& Lyle D. Calvin, Public Confidence and Admitted Tax Evasion, 37 NAT’L TAX J. 489, 493 
(1984) (finding no support, in results of a survey of Oregon taxpayers, “for the contention that a 
loss in opinion fairness from 1975 to 1980 is related to an increase in admitted income tax 
evasion” with respect to state taxes); id. at 489 and n.3 (citing studies with conflicting results).  
79 Carroll, supra note 1, at 47 (citing literature); see also Jon S. Davis, Gary Hecht & Jon 
D. Perkins, Social Behaviors, Enforcement, and Tax Compliance Dynamics, 78 ACCT. REV. 39, 
42 (2003) (citing literature). 
80 A recent model assumes three classes of taxpayers: honest ones, those susceptible to 
evasion, and evaders. See Davis, Hecht & Perkins, supra note 79, at 40. It assumes that honest 
taxpayers may be influenced by evaders and vice versa, so that as the mixture in the population 
changes, the equilibrium can change. See id. at 42. 
81 See Mason & Calvin, supra note 78, at 490 (“Sociologists have argued that survey self-
reports of deviance are useful and produce sufficiently accurate data for addressing deterrence 
issues. One can never be certain, however, and caution in interpreting self-report data is 
recommended until better measures of validity are forthcoming.”) (footnote omitted); see 
generally Alan H. Plumley, Commentary on Karyl A. Kinsey, Deterrence and Alienation 
Effects of IRS Enforcement: An Analysis of Survey Data, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 286 (Joel 
Slemrod ed., 1992) (“I do not put much stock in opinion surveys, especially ones that try to get 
honest answers from people about their behavior, especially about their future behavior, 
especially when the questions ask about possible illegal behavior, especially when the 
respondents could reasonably believe that their participation is not anonymous.”); cf. 
Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 189. 
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perception that others do not comply would lessen one’s own inclination to 
comply.82 For example, observing others’ noncompliance might change the 
observer’s moral standard so that he or she might feel less guilt in failing to 
comply.83  
Even more relevant are empirical studies of taxpayer behavior that have 
shown that at least some taxpayers respond with increased compliance to appeals 
that suggest that tax compliance is the norm.84 Yet, norms-based appeals cannot 
simply be contrasted with increased enforcement because taxpayers are 
heterogeneous. That is, there are some taxpayers for whom even the most robust 
societal norm of compliance likely has no influence.85 For example, tax 
protestors, who generally assert that the federal income tax is unconstitutional or 
 
Much of the noncompliance that accompanies self-reports is attributable to outright 
deception or misrepresentation. Tax planning and preparation generally take place at 
private meetings between the taxpayer and tax advisors (and, at times, those with whom 
the taxpayer does business). Often, the Service depends on the taxpayer and its advisors to 
report honestly the results of those meetings, and bases tax liability exclusively on those 
reports. Unfortunately, taxpayers have strong financial incentives to understate their own 
income and overstate deductions.  
Id. Of course, taxpayers lack financial incentive to lie to someone taking a survey and may be 
more honest in reporting their cheating than they are in refraining from cheating in the first 
place. 
82 See Davis, Hecht & Perkins, supra note 79, at 42. The theory of cognitive dissonance 
provides an explanation for this phenomenon: 
[w]hen we sense something in the world that is inconsistent with the cognitive frame 
through which we see the world, we initially (unconsciously) ignore or distort our 
perception. If that becomes impossible, we eventually amend our cognitive frame (i.e., the 
way we see and understand the world) to incorporate our new perception.  
Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 201 n.113. 
83 Davis, Hecht & Perkins, supra note 79, at 42. 
84 See infra text accompanying notes 89–123. Laws and norms may interact in a variety of 
ways. See McAdams, supra note 77, at 340.  
Norms turn out to matter in legal analysis for many reasons. Sometimes norms govern 
behavior irrespective of the legal rule, making the choice of a formal rule surprisingly 
unimportant. Sometimes legal rules facilitate or impede the enforcement of a norm, and 
the selection of the formal rule matters in entirely new ways, the exact consequence 
depending on whether the formal rule strengthens or weakens a desirable or undesirable 
norm. Indeed, in some cases, new norms arise in the presence of different legal rules, 
making the relevant policy choice one between two or more law-norm combinations. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). With respect to tax compliance, laws requiring compliance and societal 
norms of compliance are mutually reinforcing. See id. at 347–48 (citing Peter H. Huang & Ho-
Mou Wu, More Order Without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms and Organizational 
Cultures, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 390, 401–02 (1994)). 
85 Richard McAdams proposed that the term “societal norms” be used in contradistinction 
to the term “group norms.” See McAdams, supra note 77, at 386 n.164. 
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does not apply to them,86 probably are not influenced by general norms of 
compliance.87 Taxpayers with illegal income also are unlikely to be motivated to 
report that income by exposure to the norms of mainstream taxpayers. In fact, 
they have stronger incentives than most not to report the income because 
reporting it might expose the underlying illegal activity.88 
Nonetheless, a substantial portion of taxpayers likely do respond to exposure 
to a compliance norm. An experiment conducted by the Australian Centre for Tax 
System Integrity—a joint venture between Australian National University and the 
Australian Taxation Office89—found apparent increased compliance after 
taxpayers were informed that others report more honesty in tax compliance than 
people tend to think.90 That study was done in two parts, with the first part a 
“prestudy” involving a simulation using psychology students.91 The students 
were first given an anonymous survey asking about their honesty in paying taxes 
and their beliefs about others’ honesty in paying taxes.92 A week later, they were 
told the findings of the survey.93 The feedback given to students in the 
experimental group, which was accurate, was that on average the surveyed 
students “held the strong personal view that one should be honest in one’s tax 
matters” but that they thought that “most students would hold these same views to 
a lesser degree.”94 This was explained as an “interesting paradox” with a contrast 
 
86 As an example of this phenomenon, see David Cay Johnston, Defying the I.R.S., Anti-
Tax Businesses Refuse to Withhold, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2000, at 1. 
87 These taxpayers may belong to groups that have an opposing norm regarding tax 
compliance. Cf. McAdams, supra note 77, at 386–88. 
88 It can be particularly difficult to enforce the tax laws against taxpayers involved in 
illegal activities because they frequently may fail to keep accurate records. See United States v. 
Abodeely, 801 F.2d 1020, 1023 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating, “By the very fact that taxpayer has 
failed to report the income, it behooves him to obscure any trace of its existence.”). Prosecution 
of taxpayers with illegal income also probably has less deterrent effect on taxpayers with legal-
source income than would criminal prosecution of other taxpayers with legal-source income. 
Taxpayers engaged in illegal activity also are unlikely to be deterred by the threat of having a 
charge for tax evasion added to the charge for the underlying crime.  
89 See Wenzel, supra note 34. 
90 Id.; see also MICHAEL WENZEL, MISPERCEPTIONS OF SOCIAL NORMS ABOUT TAX 
COMPLIANCE (1): A PRESTUDY (Austl. Nat’l Univ., Austl. Taxation Office, Ctr. for Tax Sys. 
Integrity, Working Paper No. 7, 2001), available at http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/WP7.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 24, 2003).  
91 Sixty-four first-year psychology students participated in the study. Forty-four were 
female and twenty were male. They ranged in age from seventeen to forty-two years old, with a 
mean of twenty-two. Wenzel, supra note 34. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. The intervention focused only on prescriptive norms, though the first survey asked 
questions related to both prescriptive and descriptive norms. Id. Prescriptive and descriptive 
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between what most students “actually think” and “what they think most students 
think.”95 The feedback given to students in the control group related to beliefs 
about the extent of feeling informed about tax issues, reporting a similar 
“paradox,” but presumably unrelated to the normative issue the study was 
testing.96  
The students were then given another anonymous survey that, embedded in 
other questions, contained questions addressing the same information about 
compliance honesty asked for in the week-one survey.97 The students who had 
been given feedback that others’ honesty was higher than they thought increased 
their perception of others’ honesty, while the control group did not.98 
After receiving the feedback, students were given two taxpaying scenarios, 
one as part of the second survey and one purportedly part of a different study, and 
asked to specify the degree to which they would report honestly (in the first 
scenario) or defy the Australian Taxation Office (in the second scenario).99 
Students in the experimental group indicated significantly more compliance with 
respect to the first scenario and somewhat less defiance of the Australian Taxation 
Office in the second scenario than students in the control group.100 
Following the prestudy, with the support of the Australian Taxation Office, 
randomly selected taxpayers were sent a survey on their views and their beliefs 
about others’ views, particularly with respect to honesty in claimed tax 
deductions, including deductions for work-related expenses.101 Two groups of 
taxpayers received feedback on the findings, one relating to beliefs about 
“injunctive” (or “prescriptive”) norms of compliance (what people should do) and 
the other regarding “descriptive” norms of compliance (what people actually 
do).102 As in the prestudy, both of these groups were told that there was an 
“interesting paradox” relating to a gap in taxpayers’ own views and their views of 
 
norms are discussed further below, in the context of the follow-up field experiment. See infra 
text accompanying note 102. 






101 Wenzel, supra note 34. The study included a total of 1,999 Australian individual 
taxpayers, all of whom were not registered with a tax preparer, had reported wage or salary 
income greater than zero in 1999, had not been audited in 1998 or 1999, had not yet filed their 
2000 return, and had filed their previous return after September 15. Id. (The filing period 
apparently begins July 1 and the deadline for those who are not registered with a tax agent is 
October 31).  
102 Id. 
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others.103 A third group did not receive feedback, and a fourth group (the control 
group) received neither a survey nor any feedback.104 
The study found that the feedback intervention had no significant effect on 
deductions for work-related expenses, but did for other deductions.105 When both 
feedback groups were grouped together, taxpayers in those groups claimed 
significantly fewer non-work-related deductions than did the group that received 
no feedback and the control group.106 This was due primarily to strongly 
significant results of the prescriptive norm group.107 That group claimed $151 on 
average of “other” deductions, compared to $286 by the control group.108 The 
study calculated that an intervention of this type conducted with respect to 
100,000 Australian individual taxpayers would result in a revenue gain of over $2 
million (Australian).109  
The results of this study are in line with the results of an experiment 
conducted by the Minnesota Department of Revenue, which also found that a 
norms-based appeal had a positive effect on tax compliance.110 In that study, the 
Minnesota Department of Revenue sent a random sample of taxpayers a letter that 
stated, in part:  
According to a recent public opinion survey, many Minnesotans believe other 
people routinely cheat on their taxes. This is not true, however. Audits by the 
Internal Revenue Service show that people who file tax returns report correctly 
and pay voluntarily 93 percent of the income taxes they owe. Most taxpayers file 
their returns accurately and on time. Although some taxpayers owe money 
 
103 Id. Because responding to the survey was voluntary, the results, which did show a 
discrepancy between taxpayers’ own views and their beliefs about others’ views, might have 
resulted from self-selection or misrepresentation about their own views because of fear of 
sanction for reporting acceptance of dishonesty in tax compliance. See id. 
The prescriptive norm feedback letter stated in part, “[t]hese results indicate that we tend to 
think most people accept tax cheating and exaggerations in deductions. However, the truth is 
that most people think we should be honest with our tax statements and claim only those 
deductions that are allowable.” Id. The descriptive norm feedback letter stated in part, “[t]hese 
results indicate that we tend to think most people falsely overstate tax deductions. However, the 
truth is that most people say they are honest in their tax statements and claim only those 
deductions that are allowable.” Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. The experimenters were unable to explain the lack of any effect on work-related 
deductions. See id. 
106 Id. Claims for non-work-related deductions did not differ significantly between the 
group that was surveyed but received no feedback and the group that received no survey. Id. 
107 Wenzel, supra note 34. 
108 Id. The results for the control group were very similar for the survey-only group. Id. 
The dollar amounts are Australian dollars. 
109 Id. That assumes an average tax rate of 16%. Id. 
110 See infra text accompanying notes 111–14. 
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because of minor errors, a small number of taxpayers who deliberately cheat owe 
the bulk of unpaid taxes.111 
Comparison of the group that received the letter with the control group 
suggested that the letter made a modest difference in reported income and taxes 
paid.112 For a sub-group of taxpayers with a 1993 state tax balance falling 
 
111 Coleman, supra note 34, at 5–6. 
112 Id. at 18. Results of a nonparametric test suggested that Letter 2 (the norms letter) was 
associated with increased compliance. Id. at 18–19. That test could not quantify the difference. 
Id. at 10. However, the average Minnesota tax balance of the compliance norm group was $12 
higher than that of the control group. Id. at 19.  
Another study using the same data found no effect of the compliance norm letter. See 
Marsha Blumenthal, Charles Christian & Joel Slemrod, Do Normative Appeals Affect Tax 
Compliance? Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 125, 131 
& tbl.2 (2001). That study used multiple regression analysis. Id. at 130. The Coleman study 
used a variety of statistical techniques: analysis of variance, linear regression, recursive 
modeling, and a Wilcoxon nonparametric statistical test. See Coleman, supra note 34, at 9–10.  
The study by Blumenthal, Christian & Slemrod also used fewer data points. In the study 
conducted by the Minnesota Department of Revenue, the initial sample sizes for Letter 1 (a 
letter making a services-based appeal), Letter 2, and the control group were 19,885, 19,892, and 
19,901, respectively, for a total of 59,678. Coleman, supra note 34, at 44 fig.A3. The sample 
sizes used in the final analyses totaled 53,149 for Letter 1, Letter 2, and the control group. See 
id.; e-mail from Leandra Lederman, Professor of Law, George Mason University School of 
Law, to Steve Coleman, Adjunct Professor, Metropolitan State University, Doctoral Faculty, 
Graduate School of Public Administration, Hamline University (on file with author). The 
sample size for each group before statistical analyses was 17,783 for Letter 1, 17,679 for Letter 
2, and 17,702 for the control group. Id. The reason that the aggregate total of 53,164 differs 
from the 53,149 total reported may be that a few cases had missing data and therefore were 
dropped. Id.  
In the Blumenthal, Christian & Slemrod article, the sample sizes initially for Letter 1, 
Letter 2, and the control group were 20,013, 20,009, and 20,039, respectively. Blumenthal, 
Christian & Slemrod, supra, at 130 tbl.1. They eliminated cases for a variety of reasons 
specified in their article, resulting in yields of 15,615 for Letter 1; 15,536 for Letter 2; and 
15,624 for the control group. See id. Among other things, Blumenthal, Christian & Slemrod 
eliminated data points reflecting zero 1993 positive income, in an effort to exclude taxpayers 
whose tax situations changed significantly between 1993 and 1994. E-mail from Leandra 
Lederman, Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law, to Marsha Blumenthal, 
Professor of Economics, University of St. Thomas (on file with author); Blumenthal, Christian 
& Slemrod, supra, at 130 & tbl.1 (referring to elimination of cases with “[z]ero MN tax 
liability”). The Coleman study did not eliminate these cases. E-mail from Leandra Lederman, 
Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law, to Steve Coleman, Adjunct 
Professor, Metropolitan State University, Doctoral Faculty, Graduate School of Public 
Administration, Hamline University (on file with author).  
In listing their subtractions, Blumenthal, Christian & Slemrod provide the number of cases 
eliminated in order to account for duplicate 1994 returns. See Blumenthal, Christian & Slemrod, 
supra, at 130 tbl.1. They explain that “[b]ecause taxpaying entities with duplicate 1994 returns 
appear twice in the data set, we subtracted half of them in order to arrive at the number of 
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between a refund of $90 and taxes owed of $1,066,113 which represented about 
36% of all taxpayers, average taxes increased by $48 more than those of the 
controls.114  
Why are taxpayers affected by others’ behavior with respect to and attitudes 
about tax compliance? One possible explanation is that the expressed views and 
actions of others provide information about how likely the government is to detect 
and punish tax evaders.115 Another possibility is “social validation.”116 That is, 
people frequently decide how to behave by looking to the actions of other 
similarly situated people.117 This principle is used commercially by salespeople 
and by charities to encourage contributions.118  
Still another possibility, which may co-exist with the others, is that societies 
 
unique 1993 filers.” Id. at 130 n.15. The subtractions in this category for Letter 1, Letter 2, and 
the control group are 256, 234, and 276, respectively. Id. at 130 tbl.1. Interestingly, the 
difference between each initial sample size reported by Blumenthal, Christian & Slemrod and 
those reported by Coleman (128 for Letter 1, 117 for Letter 2, and 138 for the control group) is 
each exactly half of the 256, 234, and 276 cases that Blumenthal, Christian & Slemrod report 
eliminating because of duplicate 1994 returns. In other words, it seems possible that with 
respect to entities filing duplicate 1994 returns, Blumenthal, Christian & Slemrod eliminated 
two returns for each one return eliminated by Coleman. 
113 This and other subgroups in the experiment were selected using:  
[T]he statistical method of decision-tree analysis or recursive modeling, as implemented in 
the FIRM computer program by Professor Douglas Hawkins. . . . The FIRM computer 
program partitioned the sample into a large number of possible subgroups based on a list 
of variables that we tried as potential predictors of changes in taxes or income. . . . The 
program then automatically found the subgroups that had the most significant differences 
(if any) in the change in taxes or income in relation to the predictor variables or the 
experimental treatment. 
Coleman, supra note 34, at 9–10 (citation omitted). The study created subgroups based on 1993 
data to protect the randomization. Id. 
114 Id. at 19. This subgroup was selected by computer as having the most pronounced 
effect, so there is no similar subgroup for the audit letter. 
115 See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of Social Norms 
in Corporate Environmental Compliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 113 (2003) (“The effect of 
perceptions of widespread [tax] noncompliance on intentions to comply in the future may result 
from the norm of conformity, or may simply be the product of a perceived reduction in the risk 
of formal or informal sanctions.”). 
116 See Cialdini, supra note 35, at 213; see also BRUNO S. FREY & STEPHEN MEIER, PRO-
SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, RECIPROCITY OR BOTH? 3 (Inst. for Empirical Res. in Econ., U. of Zurich, 
Working Paper No. 107, 2002), available at http://www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/iewwp107.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2003) (arguing that “there is very important pro-social behavior that goas [sic] 
beyond reciprocity.”). 
117 Cialdini, supra note 35, at 213–14 (citing and discussing literature).  
118 Id. at 214. 
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may have norms of compliance or noncompliance with tax obligations.119 There 
is evidence that, in the United States, tax evasion carries a stigma.120 For 
example, some states have increased their collection of delinquent taxes by 
posting the names of tax delinquents on the internet.121 
What might explain a societal norm of tax compliance in the United 
States?122 There is a widely studied human tendency to reciprocate and cooperate 
 
119 In fact, tax compliance norms likely vary among countries. One study found that in 
similar tax compliance experiments, the average compliance rate was significantly higher for 
American students than for Spanish students. See Alm, Sanchez & de Juan, supra note 22, at 
164. Another tax compliance study found that compliance in the experiments was generally 
higher in Botswana than in the United States, and higher in both countries than in South Africa. 
James Alm & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Institutions, Paradigms, and Tax Evasion in 
Developing and Transition Countries, in PUBLIC FINANCE IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL 
COUNTRIES 146, 162–63 (James Alm & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez eds., 2003) (reporting on 
RONALD G. CUMMINGS, JORGE MARTINEZ-VAZQUEZ, & M. MCKEE, CROSS-CULTURAL 
COMPARISONS OF TAX COMPLIANCE BEHAVIOR (International Studies Program, Andrew Young 
School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, Working Paper, 2001)).  
120 See Davis, Hecht & Perkins, supra note 79, at 44 (citing Wilbur J. Scott & Harold S. 
Grasmick, Deterrence and Income Tax Cheating, 17 J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 395 (1981)). 
Davis, Hecht, and Perkins point out that the stigma varies among countries. See id. 
121 See, e.g., Department of Revenue Adds More Delinquent Taxpayers’ Names to 
Website (February 11, 2002), at http://www.dor.state.nc.us/press/jan02/addsnames.html (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2003) (discussing North Carolina’s success with this tactic); see also infra note 
218 (listing more states using this approach). 
122 Professor Eric Posner has argued that tax compliance is a way in which taxpayers 
“signal” that they belong to a “good type” with a low “discount rate” and therefore will 
cooperate in exchanges with other members of society rather than taking advantage of them. 
Posner, supra note 22, at 1787–88. A person with a high discount rate disproportionately values 
current payoffs, while a person with a low discount rate does not. See id. at 1786–87. Under 
Posner’s model, each individual in the society has private information about his or her own 
discount rate, so they need a way to convince others that they have a low discount rate. See id at 
1787. “Talk is cheap”—and therefore unreliable—but “signals” are costly, observable 
behaviors that provide no benefit to the signaler other than providing information. Id. at 1787. 
The best signals are those that only “good types” can afford to send—that is, the investment can 
only be recovered over the long term. Id. at 1787–88.  
Posner’s general signaling theory has been criticized by many scholars as inaccurate and 
unconvincing. See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 11; see also Richard H. McAdams, Signaling 
Discount Rates: Law, Norms, and Economic Methodology, 110 YALE L.J. 625 (2001) (review 
of ERIC POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000)); Symposium, Commentaries on Eric 
Posner’s Law and Social Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 327–463 (2002). In addition, as an 
explanation of taxpayer compliance, the signaling theory has fundamental problems. By 
definition, signals must be observable by others in the society. Tax compliance generally is not 
readily observable because the government is required to keep tax return information 
confidential. See I.R.C. §§ 6103, 7431 (2002). Taxpayers do not generally disclose their returns 
to the public for examination. See Kahan, supra note 11, at 379 (“[A]nyone who showed up at a 
commercial negotiation eager to display his or her latest tax returns would probably be regarded 
not as a trustworthy business partner but as some kind of freak.”).  
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with others that provides a convincing theoretical base for such a norm.123 That 
is, because people are more likely to contribute to public goods when others do, 
the development of a sense that others are contributing is likely an important 
factor in tax compliance. Therefore, the reciprocation impulse may stem from a 
fairness norm.124 If that is the case, it is important to determine the effect on 
perceived fairness of sanctions imposed on those who do not cooperate. These 
issues are discussed in turn below. 
A. Cooperation in Group Effort 
Economic models suggest that rational wealth maximizers will not 
reciprocate with strangers or contribute to public goods in the absence of repeat 
player interactions where non-contributors can be detected and punished.125 Yet, 
 
However, as Posner points out, there is one extreme at which noncompliance may be 
observable by others: those who are punished criminally for tax evasion. Posner, supra note 22, 
at 1789 (“It is because detection of violation is so infrequent—it must involve a public 
prosecution following an audit, which, as we have already noted, is rare—that the response of 
potential cooperative partners is so severe. In mainstream society, the ex-convict is 
meticulously avoided.”). Because the punishment is so rare, the argument goes, the stigma is 
particularly strong, and fear of the stigma prompts others to comply with the law. Id. at 1790. 
As indicated above, there is evidence that tax evasion in the United States may be stigmatized 
(even without a criminal conviction), see supra notes 117–20 and accompanying text, which 
supports the force of a compliance norm.  
Nonetheless, the stigma attached to criminal conviction for tax evasion does not support a 
signaling argument. It may be that many people treat convicted criminals, including those 
convicted of tax evasion—a tiny minority of the population—as belonging to a “bad type.” Yet, 
this does not mean that failure to be convicted of (or even indicted for) tax evasion signals 
belonging to a good type; it simply means that a particular red flag is absent. 
In effect, Posner’s argument suggests not that people send signals by paying taxes, but 
rather, that in an economic calculus of whether to evade tax, individuals must factor in not only 
the nominal sanction but also the stigma or shunning they would experience if caught. See 
Posner, supra note 22, at 1793 (“[I]t is no exaggeration that many fear . . . stigma as much as, or 
more than, fines or imprisonment.”); see also Spicer, supra note 1, at 16 (“Survey research . . . 
indicates that informal sanctions such as low social standing may be as, if not more important 
than formal sanctions in motivating compliance.”). 
123 See infra text accompanying notes 125–72; see also Smith, supra note 78, at 225 
(“One of the strongest social psychological reasons for expecting that positive behaviors by 
administrators toward taxpayers will increase the likelihood of compliance is the strong 
tendency for humans to try to reciprocate, in kind, behaviors directed toward them.”) (citations 
omitted). Professor Dan Kahan has proposed this explanation as a more persuasive alternative 
to Eric Posner’s signaling explanation of tax compliance. See Kahan, supra note 11, at 380; see 
also Kahan, supra note 36, at 335–44. 
124 See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 5, at 1135 (discussing ultimatum games). 
125 See John O. Ledyard, Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 111, 112 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 
1995) (discussing the “economic/game-theoretic” prediction of free riding); cf. Cass R. 
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people do cooperate in laboratory experiments, even when play is anonymous and 
the game does not involve repeated interactions of unknown duration.126 For 
example, in the “gift exchange game,” which involves the setting of a “wage” and 
“effort levels,” players act to reward fair or generous behavior.127 The 
reciprocation phenomenon also seems to hold true in real world settings, such as 
the labor market.128 Reciprocation in these contexts appears to hinge on 
contributors’ perception that they are not being taken advantage of. That is, 
people will contribute when they perceive others doing so but withhold 
contributions when they perceive defection by others. 
Another set of experiments involves what is termed the “ultimatum game,” in 
which randomly paired subjects must divide up an amount of money.129 The rules 
require the subject designated as the proposer to make an offer to the other 
 
Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909 (1996) (“There is no 
simple contrast between ‘rationality’ or ‘rational self-interest’ and social norms. Individual 
rationality is a function of social norms.”) (footnote omitted). 
126 See Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Do Incentive Contracts Crowd Out Voluntary 
Cooperation? (USC Center for Law, Econ. & Org., Research Paper No. C01-3, 2001), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=229047 (last visited Oct. 24, 2003); Ernst Fehr 
& Urs Fischbacher, Why Social Preferences Matter—The Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on 
Competition, Cooperation and Incentives, ECON. J. C1, C5–6 (2002) (discussing “Dictator 
Games” and “Ultimatum Games”); Kahan, supra note 36, at 335–36 (discussing this literature). 
A useful list of the games typically used in these types of experiments, findings, and real 
life analogies is contained in COLIN F. CAMERER & ERNST FEHR, MEASURING SOCIAL NORMS 
AND PREFERENCES USING EXPERIMENTAL GAMES: A GUIDE FOR SOCIAL SCIENTISTS 7–8 (Inst. 
for Empirical Res. in Econ., U. of Zurich, Working Paper No. 97, 2002), available at 
http://www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/iewwp097.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2003). 
127 This game was developed by Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl. See Ernst Fehr, Georg 
Kirchsteiger & Arno Riedl, Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental 
Investigation, 108 Q. J. ECON. 437 (1993). 
128 Kahan, supra note 36, at 337 (discussing phenomenon that employees at firms 
perceived to pay better than average compensation work harder and phenomenon of firms’ 
avoidance of pay cuts during recessions); see also Daniel Roth, How to Cut Pay, Lay Off 8,000 
People, and Still Have Workers Who Love You, FORTUNE, Feb. 4, 2002, at 64. 
[In Fortune’s interviews] a host of . . . actions were raised: the Hail Mary steps the 
company took to avoid downsizing; the barrage of e-mails and face-to-face meetings with 
top management down; even the tired sound in the CEO’s voice as he delivered news of 
mass layoffs. Together, these created an atmosphere in which people like [Cheryl] 
Ways—three months after being axed—could say of her bosses, “I felt horrible they had to 
do this,” and of her former co-workers, “This was my gift to them: to leave my job in the 
best way possible.” 
Id. 
129 This game was developed by Guth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze. See Werner Guth, 
Rolf Schmittberger, & Bernd Schwarze, An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 
J. ECON. BEH. & ORG. 367 (1982). 
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subject, the responder.130 The responder is entitled to accept the proposal (and 
keep that amount) or reject it, in which case both proposer and responder receive 
nothing.131 The game is not repeated between the same players, and they act 
anonymously.132 Economic analysis suggests that the responder will accept any 
positive amount because that is better than nothing.133 However, responders often 
reject sums offered that were less than 20% of the pot, and the probability of 
rejection increases as the size of the offered amount decreases.134 Other 
experiments produce similar results.135  
These results suggest that players do not act out of pure self-interest; rational 
responders should always accept the proposed division. The proposer’s actions 
depend on his or her prediction of the responder’s behavior; if the responder 
rejects the offer, the proposer receives nothing.136 The “dictator” game removes 
that link, facilitating analysis of the proposer’s behavior.137 In the dictator game, 
the proposer is given a fixed sum of money and given the opportunity to divide it 
with an anonymous second player who has no opportunity to reject the 
division.138 The dictator therefore has no financial incentive to make a positive 
offer; he keeps whatever he does not give away.  
The initial study of the dictator game found that the average offer, though 
lower than in the ultimatum game, was positive, and that many proposers gave 
away 30 to 50% of the stake.139 Those results may seem to suggest a taste for 
equity. However, when the dictator game was redesigned so as to be double blind, 
providing assurances to the players that even the experimenters did not know 
 
130 See Fehr & Fischbacher, supra note 126, at C5. 
131 Id. 
132 Id.  
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 For example, in the “investment game,” an initial player is given a sum of money and 
given the option of keeping it or transferring some amount, which will be multiplied and given 
to a second player, who can either keep the amount received or transfer some portion back to 
the initial player. The second player has every incentive to keep all that he receives. However, 
the second player typically transfers some of the surplus to the first player. The first player, 
anticipating that, generally transfers some amount to the second player rather than keeping it all. 
Kahan, supra note 36, at 336; see Fehr & Gächter, supra note 38, at 162. 
136 THEODORE C. BERGSTROM, VERNON SMITH’S INSOMNIA AND THE DAWN OF 
ECONOMICS AS EXPERIMENTAL SCIENCE 21 (Working Paper, 2002), available at http:// 
econwpa.wustl.edu:8089/eps/mic/papers/0212/0212001.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2003).  
137 See id.; Robert Forsythe, Joel L. Horowitz, N.E. Savin & Martin Sefton, Fairness in 
Simple Bargaining Experiments, 6 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 347, 362–63 (1994).  
138 See BERGSTROM, supra note 136, at 21. 
139 Id.  
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which proposer was sharing what amount,140 over 60% of the proposers 
transferred nothing and approximately 80% transferred 10% or less of the 
stake.141 This result suggests the possibility that many players were concerned not 
with “equity” or “fairness” but instead with the esteem afforded them by the 
experimenters.142  
Nonetheless, in the double blind version of the game, which has been 
replicated in a number of studies, about a third of dictators do share, and on 
average, they share 8 to 16% of the stake.143 What explains that result? In order to 
test if reciprocity between dictators and recipient was not completely removed 
even in the double blind study, one study compared the effect on donations where 
recipients randomly selected from the general population were mailed any money 
that was donated.144 In the first part of the study, a traditional double blind study, 
33.34% of the dictators donated some money and the average amount shared was 
13.33% of the initial stake.145 In the second part, involving randomly selected 
recipients, 31.48% of the dictators donated some money and the average amount 
shared was 8.89% of the initial stake.146 The difference in results between the two 
procedures was not statistically significant.147 
These results suggest that eliminating otherwise consistent behavior of 
seemingly irrational generosity or reciprocation requires a context in which 
people are assured of permanent and complete anonymity. And even in that 
context, approximately one-third of players shared some amount. Human 
behavior may reflect an internalized norm148 of reciprocation149 in less artificial 
 
140 That is, the transfers were made with anonymous envelopes placed in a box. See 
Magnus Johannesson & Björn Persson, Non-Reciprocal Altruism in Dictator Games, 69 ECON. 
LETTERS 137, 138 (2000). 
141 See Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin A. McCabe, Keith Shachat & Vernon L. Smith, 
Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games, in BARGAINING AND 
MARKET BEHAVIOR 90, 111 (Vernon L. Smith ed., 2000).  
142 See BERGSTROM, supra note 136, at 21. 
143 See Johannesson & Persson, supra note 140, at 137–38. 
144 Id. at 138. 
145 Id. at 139 (The initial stake was 100 Swedish crowns, approximately $11.76. Id. at 
138.). 
146 Id. at 140. 
147 Id. at 141. 
148 See Carlson, supra note 28, at 1238 (nonlegal rules that people feel compelled to 
follow because they would feel guilty otherwise are internalized norms). Richard McAdams has 
persuasively argued that more abstract norms may be internalized, while more concrete ones 
may not be, but may be enforced through the mechanism of esteem. See McAdams, supra note 
77, at 383. He critiques Robert Cooter’s argument that “ ‘a social norm is ineffective in a 
community and does not exist unless people internalize it.’ ” See id. at 377 (quoting Robert D. 
Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating 
the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1665 (1996)). 
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contexts; that is, “[w]hat may be wrong is the very idea that instances of human 
decision interaction can be construed as without a history or a future.”150  
An example of a more realistic context for generosity is provided by a study 
of University of Zurich student contributions to two University-administered 
“social funds,” one providing low-cost loans to students in need, and the other 
supporting foreign students.151 The study found that, over a period of several 
years, approximately 68% of students at the University of Zurich contributed to at 
least one of the two funds under what the study authors term “anonymous” 
conditions.152 That is, students could decide whether or not to contribute in the 
privacy of their own homes.153 However, student contributions were not 
anonymous to the University because they were made with the tuition 
payment.154 
 
149 See Kahan, supra note 11, at 368–69. Reciprocity is probably an internalized norm that 
results from socialization in childhood. See Cialdini, supra note 35, at 211. The reciprocity 
norm spans human societies. Id. (citing Alvin Gouldner, The Norm of Reciprocity, 25 AMER. 
SOC. REV. 161 (1960)). The systems of exchange it allows provide “immense benefit” to the 
societies that develop them. Id.  
150 Hoffman et al., supra note 141. However, players in the games do seem to be able to 
distinguish one-shot interactions from repeat play. See ERNST FEHR & KLAUS SCHMIDT, 
THEORIES OF FAIRNESS AND RECIPROCITY—EVIDENCE AND ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS 10–11 
(Inst. for Empirical Res. in Econ., U. of Zurich, Working Paper No. 75, 2001), available at 
http://www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/iewwp075.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2003). 
151 See FREY & MEIER, supra note 116, at 67. 
152 Id. at 3, 7. The amount of the contribution requested for the low-cost loan fund was 
CHF 7 (approximately US $4.20) and the requested contribution to the foreigners’ fund was 
CHF 5 (about US $3). Id. at 7. These amounts were requested of every student every semester. 
Id. From 1998 to 2001, on average approximately 61% of students contributed to both funds 
and 68% contributed to at least one. Id. at 8. The manner of requesting contributions changed in 
1998. Id. at 11. Before the change, the only option was to contribute to both funds or to neither 
fund. Id. From 1993 through 1997, on average, 44% of students contributed to both funds. Id. at 
11, 28 fig.3. 
153 Id. at 8.  
154 See id. at 11. Until the winter 1998 term, students received two tuition invoices, one 
with no contribution to the social funds and one with contributions to both social funds. Id. 
After that term, the University began registering students electronically. During the registration 
process, students were allowed to opt to check boxes if they wished to contribute to either or 
both funds. Id. The University sends an invoice approximately a month later that includes the 
requested contribution amount. Id. In neither scenario is the amount of any particular student’s 
contribution anonymous to the University. 
The study found a lower probability of contribution (by 2.3 percentage points) by students 
about to begin the first semester of study and an even lower probability of contribution (by 6.6 
percentage points) by students about to begin the final semester of study, where students no 
longer attend classes. Id. at 13. The authors find this consistent with the hypothesis of pro-social 
behavior in terms of attachment to the University as an organization. Id. at 12–13. However, it 
also seems consistent with consideration for the esteem of University administrators. Arguably, 
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The games described above involve two-party exchanges, but contribution 
games that attempt to replicate the public goods context also find that players 
cooperate despite economic incentives to free ride.155 For example, in the “group 
exchange” game, a group of strangers is given an initial sum and then given the 
opportunity, in secret, to retain it or invest some or all of it in a group fund.156 The 
players are told that the amount in the fund will be doubled (or multiplied by 
some number greater than one and less than the total number of players) and then 
will be redistributed equally to all players regardless of whether a player has 
contributed or not.157 The game is played for a specific number of rounds stated 
in advance (usually 10 rounds).158 
Each player’s maximizing strategy is to free ride on the contributions of the 
others, although that will not maximize the overall return to the group.159 
However, experiments have shown that many participants do contribute, and, on 
average, players start out by contributing 40 to 60% of the initial sum they 
received.160 In subsequent rounds, players’ contributions reflect the contributions 
of others, so that, in the typical situation in which a few players free ride,161 other 
players gradually reduce their own contributions,162 so that the average 
contribution is very low in the last round.163  
An experiment that included a surprise “restart” after ten rounds ruled out 
learning as an explanation for the decline in contributions.164 Further experiments 
 
students may be most concerned about esteem of administrators while they are physically on 
campus attending classes than before or after that period of study. 
155 See Ledyard, supra note 125, at 112–13 (discussing public goods games); see also 
Kahan, supra note 36, at 335–36 (discussing these games). 
156 See Ledyard, supra note 125, at 112–13. 
157 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 5, at 1140; see also Ledyard, supra note 125, at 112. 
158 See Kahan, supra note 36, at 335 (“finite number of rounds specified in advance”); 
FEHR & SCHMIDT, supra note 150, at 7 (10 periods). 
159 That is, each player rationally should contribute zero in the last round. Elinor Ostrom, 
Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2000, at 137, 
139. Therefore, each player should contribute zero in the penultimate round, and so on. Id.  
160 See id. at 140. The same level of contribution also holds for a one-round public goods 
game. Id. 
161 As discussed, the availability of punishments limits free riding. See infra text 
accompanying notes 231–239. Even the addition of “cheap talk”—where players can assure 
each other that they will contribute—decreases free riding. See Kahan, supra note 36, at 336 
(citing Ledyard, supra note 125, at 156–58; Ostrom, supra note 159, at 140–41). 
162 In the round that was specified in advance to be the last round, typically 70% of 
players contribute nothing. Ostrom, supra note 159, at 140. 
163 See Kahan, supra note 36, at 335–36; Claudia Keser & Frans van Winden, 
Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods, 102 SCANDANAVIAN J. 
ECON. 23, 31 (2000). 
164 See James Andreoni, Why Free Ride? Strategies and Learning in Public Goods 
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suggest that the explanation is that many players are “conditional cooperators” 
who begin with cautious cooperation and then respond to others’ actions.165 For 
example, one study found that approximately one-third of players in a public 
goods experiment were free riders.166 That study also found that approximately 
50% of the players were conditional cooperators so that their contributions 
increased in response to increases in others’ contributions.167 An additional 14% 
were conditionally cooperative up to certain contribution levels and then 
decreased their contributions.168 In other words, a majority of players will begin a 
repeat-play game by cooperating and in subsequent rounds will respond to others’ 
contributions.169 
The tax context is somewhat more complicated because it involves a much 
more indirect return of goods and services in kind than public goods experiments 
do. Taxpayers may therefore factor in not only the compliance behavior of others 
but also the government’s compliance with the contract to provide public 
goods.170 Professor John Scholz has advanced this “contractarian” theory of tax 
compliance.171 Currently available evidence on the question of whether taxpayers 
 
Experiments, 37 J. PUBL. ECON. 291, 300 (1988). This result has been found in subsequent 
studies. See Rachel T.A. Croson, Partners and Strangers Revisited, 53 ECON. LETTERS 25, 31 
(1996). 
165 See Spicer, supra note 1, at 16 (“Public choice theory suggests that the free-rider 
problem can be reduced if individuals pursue a strategy of conditional cooperation.”); see also 
James Andreoni, Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?, 85 
AMER. ECON. REV. 891 (1995); Kahan, supra note 11, at 375 (“Such studies [of collective 
action dynamics] consistently show that most individuals in collective action settings tend to 
adopt a conditionally cooperative stance, contributing to collective goods if and to the extent 
that they perceive the others are inclined to do the same.”); Keser & van Winden, supra note 
163, at 32 (finding support for conditional cooperation in twenty-five round comparison of 
partner and stranger conditions in game with six stranger sessions); Ostrom, supra note 159, at 
142 (“Conditional cooperators are the source of the relatively high levels of contributions in 
one-shot or initial rounds of prisoner’s dilemma and public good games.”). 
166 URS FISCHBACHER, SIMON GÄCHTER & ERNST FEHR, ARE PEOPLE CONDITIONALLY 
COOPERATIVE? EVIDENCE FROM A PUBLIC GOODS EXPERIMENT 3 (Inst. for Empirical Res. in 
Econ., U. of Zurich, Working Paper No. 16, 2000), available at http://www.iew.unizh.ch 
/wp/iewwp016.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2003). 
167 Id. at 3.  
168 Id. at 8. 
169 A study carefully designed to distinguish conditional cooperators from other players 
found evidence of conditional cooperators. See JOEP SONNEMANS, ARTHUR SCHRAM & THEO 
OFFERMAN, STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC GOOD GAMES: WHEN PARTNERS REALLY 
BECOME STRANGERS 9 (Working Paper, 1996), available at http://www1.fee.uva.nl/ 
creed/pdffiles/strat.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2003). 
170 See Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein, supra note 10, at 851 (discussing literature). 
171 See generally John T. Scholz, Contractual Compliance and the Federal Income Tax 
System, 13 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y (forthcoming 2003); cf. Lee Anne Fennell & Christopher C. 
1484 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1453 
 
                                                                                                                  
take account of services provided by the government in determining their level of 
compliance is inconclusive.172 One possibility is that, at least if the government 
provides some minimum level of service to the society, the perception that others 
are contributing may be more important than the perception that one’s own 
contributions are returned in kind by the government, particularly given the 
redistributive nature of taxes. 
B. The Effect of Enforcement on Compliance Norms  
When people are inclined to contribute voluntarily, will the addition of 
incentives to contribute or sanctions for noncontribution backfire? Professor Dan 
Kahan has stated that “far from promoting compliance, simply increasing the 
penalties for evasion has been shown to undermine it, at least in societies that 
otherwise enjoy relatively compliant norms.”173 He supports this assertion in the 
next two sentences with reference to two studies, one by Schwartz and Orleans, 
which involved surveys emphasizing either the severity of sanctions for tax 
 
Fennell, Fear and Greed in Tax Policy: A Qualitative Research Agenda, 13 WASH. U. J. L. & 
POL'Y 75 (2003). Scholz’s theory draws on Yoram Barzel’s model of the state, which 
contemplates a give-and-take between governer and governed. See generally YORAM BARZEL, 
A THEORY OF THE STATE: ECONOMIC RIGHTS, LEGAL RIGHTS, AND THE SCOPE OF THE STATE 
(2002). 
172 A letter sent as part of the compliance experiment conducted by the Minnesota 
Department of Revenue making an appeal based on the valuable services provided by the state 
found no statistically significant effect. See Coleman, supra note 34, at 5, 16, 18; see also 
Blumenthal, Christian & Slemrod, supra note 112, at 130–32 (also reporting results from the 
Minnesota study). A laboratory experiment found that compliance is greater when the majority 
vote of players determines the use of their contributions to a public good and higher when the 
vote is decisive, not close. See James Alm, Betty R. Jackson & Michael McKee, Fiscal 
Exchange, Collective Decision Institutions, and Tax Compliance, 22 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 
285 (1993) (cited by Alm, Jackson & McKee, supra note 29, at 324–25). 
An older study found positive effects of an appeal to conscience. See Schwartz & Orleans, 
supra note 62, at 295–96. In that study, taxpayers who were interviewed using a survey 
containing questions focusing on conscience-based reasons to pay tax, including the activities 
funded by taxes, increased their income tax after credits from one year to the next by a mean of 
$243 compared to $11 for those responding to a survey focusing on sanctions for tax evasion, 
and a mean decrease of $40 for a treated control and $57 for an untreated control. Id. at 296. 
Unfortunately, the study did not isolate a services-based rationale for contribution from one that 
might appeal to a norm of reciprocal cooperation. See id. at 287 n.46 (“The set of questions 
intended to induce a conscience effect were designed to arouse motives for paying taxes 
ranging from guilt at violation to a patriotic desire to support the government in its most valued 
activities.”). One question in the “conscience” survey focused on people “putting their own self 
interest above the interest of others,” for example. See id. at 288 n.46. That may raise notions of 
the esteem-worthiness of the behavior.  
173 Kahan, supra note 11, at 377. Kahan does not provide a citation in support of this 
proposition but in the next two sentences refers to two studies, as discussed in the text above. 
See infra text accompanying notes 174–187. 
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evasion or moral reasons to pay taxes,174 and one by Sheffrin and Triest involving 
students who were shown statements about IRS plans to increase audits.175 
However, these studies do not provide convincing support for the proposition.  
Professor Kahan asserts that the Schwartz and Orleans study “found that 
taxpayers who were exposed to information emphasizing the severity of tax-
evasion penalties claimed more deductions than did similarly situated taxpayers 
exposed either to a moral appeal or to no information at all.”176 That study did 
find a greater effect of the conscience-based appeal than the sanctions threat.177 
However, it did not find that the sanction-treated taxpayers claimed more 
deductions than those exposed to no information; rather, “the untreated control 
shows even higher deductions than the sanction treated group.”178 In addition, 
income tax after credits (a more accurate measure of taxes paid than claimed 
deductions) increased, on average, by $11 for those responding to the survey 
 
174 Kahan, supra note 11, at 377 (citing Schwartz & Orleans, supra note 62, at 298–99). 
175 Id. (citing Steven M. Sheffrin & Robert K. Triest, Can Brute Deterrence Backfire? 
Perceptions and Attitudes in Taxpayer Compliance, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 193, 212–13 
(Joel Slemrod ed., 1992)).  
176 Id. (citing Schwartz & Orleans, supra note 62, at 298–99). 
177 Schwartz & Orleans, supra note 62, at 295 (mean increase in AGI of $804 for the 
moral appeal group and $181 for the sanction group). 
It would be interesting to try to replicate this result now, approximately forty years after 
that survey was done. (The survey must have been conducted in the spring of 1963. See id. at 
285–86 (taxpayers “were interviewed during the month before filing their returns”); id. at 294 
(returns for fiscal year 1961 were filed before the interview and returns for fiscal year 1962 
were filed after the interview)).  
178 Id. at 298. The “placebo control,” which is the group of taxpayers that was interviewed 
with a survey that did not contain questions focused on either sanctions or moral reasons to pay 
taxes, did have a lower increase in claimed deductions than the conscience group. Id. at 288, 
298. 
The untreated control had the highest average increase in deductions between 1961 and 
1962 ($320). The sanction threat group had the next highest ($273). The conscience appeal had 
the next highest ($177) and the placebo control had the lowest ($132). Id. at 296 tbl.V. One 
issue in this study may be the relatively small number of taxpayers in each group. The sanction 
group had eighty-seven taxpayers, the conscience appeal and placebo groups each contained 
eighty-eight, and the untreated control had one hundred eleven. Id. Schwartz and Orleans state, 
in part: 
[T]hose threatened with sanction had a mean increase in deductions [between 1961 and 
1962] of $273, compared with $177 for the normative group. It is tempting to interpret this 
difference as meaning that the threatened group said: “You may beat me into admitting 
higher income, but I’ll find a way of getting it back.” One might also infer that the 
conscience-appeal group kept its deductions low in the recognition of the importance of 
tax payments for the welfare of the country. 
These interpretations lose force, however, from the position of the two control groups 
on deductions. 
Id. at 298 (citation omitted). 
1486 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1453 
 
                                                                                                                  
focused on sanctions for tax evasion, compared to an average decrease of $40 for 
the treated control and $57 for the untreated control.179 
The Sheffrin and Triest study also does not support Professor Kahan’s 
assertion that “increasing the penalties for evasion has been shown to undermine 
it . . . .”180 The Sheffrin and Triest study had nothing to do with increased 
penalties for evasion but rather was designed to test their view that (1) “ ‘tax gap’ 
stories tend to be alarmist and defeatist and can breed public skepticism . . .”181 
and (2) “specific and detailed stories about compliance problems are less likely to 
have deleterious effects on overall perceptions.”182  
The study posed questions to economics students after they read one of two 
statements.183 One group of students read the following statement: 
The Internal Revenue Service is increasing the resources it is devoting to 
auditing tax returns and improving tax compliance. New computer systems are 
being installed and the IRS is improving its ability to use these computers to 
check for completeness and accuracy of returns. The goal of the IRS is to make 
sure that all taxpayers, corporations as well as individuals, are paying their fair 
share of taxes.184 
The other group read the following statement before they answered the questions: 
The Internal Revenue Service announced today that the “tax gap” or the total of 
taxes which are due to the IRS but have not been collected have reached over 
$100 billion. The director of the IRS testified to Congress that the IRS was 
stepping up its efforts to collect these unpaid taxes. New computer systems were 
being installed, the director noted, to aid in collecting these funds.185 
Kahan states that the “study found that individuals who were shown actual press 
 
179 Id. at 296 tbl.V. The conscience appeal had the strongest effect, with a mean $243 
increase in income tax after credits. Id. 
180 Kahan, supra note 11, at 377. The Sheffrin and Triest study has also been cited for the 
proposition that an increase in audit rates will increase noncompliance. See Vandenbergh, supra 
note 115, at 113 & n.202. The logic seems to be that an increase in audit rates signals taxpayer 
dishonesty, which in turn will lower compliance. See id. at 113 & n.201. However, Sheffrin and 
Triest did not study whether an increase in audit rates lowered compliance or even whether 
such an increase would affect the perceived dishonesty of others. See generally Sheffrin & 
Triest, supra note 175. Other studies have found that higher audit rates correlate with higher 
compliance rates. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.  
181 Sheffrin & Triest, supra note 175, at 211. 
182 Id. 
183 The Sheffrin & Triest article does not state that these are actual press accounts. See id.  
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 211–12. 
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accounts of an IRS plan to attack the ‘tax gap’ with stepped-up auditing displayed 
a weaker commitment to paying their own taxes.”186 In fact, the economics 
students in the study who were exposed to the “tax gap” statement showed a more 
negative attitude toward the tax system and tax compliance than the students who 
read the other statement, but the effect was small and statistically insignificant.187 
The study made no comparison with any other students or taxpayers. 
The study’s results are not surprising. However, they do not show that the 
threat of audit (much less increased penalties) decreases compliance; the study 
was not designed to test that. Rather, the study shows that publicity of large tax 
gap figures tend to increase others’ perceived dishonesty.188 If auditing will 
remain low even after a planned increase in audits,189 the increase may not be 
sufficient to convince conditionally cooperative taxpayers that they will not be 
“chumps” if they pay all of their taxes.190 
 
186 Kahan, supra note 11, at 377. 
187 Sheffrin & Triest, supra note 175, at 212; see id. at 213 tbl.6, Questions 1 and 2. 
Sheffrin and Triest referred to this as the “attitude toward government” variable. Id. at 212. 
Reading the “tax gap” statement was associated with statistically significant decreases in others’ 
perceived honesty and the perceived probability of being caught when cheating by a small 
amount. Id. at 213.  
188 See id. at 213.  
189 The “tax gap” statement in Sheffrin and Triest provides, in part, “The director of the 
IRS testified to Congress that the IRS was stepping up its efforts to collect these unpaid taxes. 
New computer systems were being installed, the director noted, to aid in collecting these 
funds.” Id. at 212. This does not necessarily imply a substantial increase in audits. 
190 Cf. Janet Novack, Are You a Chump?, FORBES, Mar. 5, 2001, at 125 (“ ‘[H]ow can the 
IRS assure folks who are paying their fair share that they’re not chumps?’ ”) (quoting former 
Commissioner Lawrence B. Gibbs); FREY & MEIER, supra note 116, at 10 (“Individuals dislike 
being a so-called ‘sucker,’ i.e., being the only one who contributes to a public good while the 
others free ride.”); see also Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 591, 604 (1996) (“Even a strong propensity to obey the law . . . can be undercut by a 
person's ‘desire not to be suckered.’ ”) (footnote omitted); Stark, supra note 29, at 123. 
The compliant taxpayer does not want to be the chump for someone who does not pay his 
taxes but nevertheless shares in the collective benefit defrayed by the taxes collected. Thus, 
a sense of satisfaction must arise when the noncompliant taxpayer is found out and made 
to pay the piper.  
Id.  
The trick may be to portray enforcement as a means to bring into compliance what 
amounts to a small minority of taxpayers, rather than implying that noncompliance is the norm. 
See Vandenbergh, supra note 115, at 115. 
To avoid sending the message that noncompliance is widespread among similar others, 
enforcement announcements may achieve greater success if they focus less on large, high-
profile announcements than on broad, low-profile actions. If high-profile announcements 
are necessary for reasons unrelated to informal social regulation (e.g., to maintain 
congressional or public support for enforcement), the message may need careful scripting 
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In fact, Kent Smith’s analysis of a survey performed for the IRS showed that 
a higher belief in the perceived likelihood that small tax cheaters would be caught 
decreased the normative acceptability of underreporting.191 This was consistent 
with his hypothesis that “[c]itizens . . . are more likely to take their taxpaying 
obligations seriously if they perceive that the state does also. A primary indicator 
of the state’s interest is its concern with detecting and punishing 
noncompliance.”192 
 
to convey the notion that compliance is widespread, that the rare instances of 
noncompliance occur among dissimilar others, and that the noncompliance will likely lead 
to detection and large formal and informal sanctions. 
Id. (footnote omitted); cf. Coleman, supra note 34, at 5–6 (stating, in norms letter mailed to 
randomly selected taxpayers, “[m]ost taxpayers file their returns accurately and on time. 
Although some taxpayers owe money because of minor errors, a small number of taxpayers 
who deliberately cheat owe the bulk of unpaid taxes”). 
Arguably, the offer-in-compromise program may undermine taxpayer assurance that 
others are paying their tax obligations by letting taxpayers who legally owe taxes compromise 
those obligations for a small fraction of the liability. The following table provides a time trend 
of the offer-in-compromise program: 
 
Fiscal Year 
Amount Accepted in 
Compromise 
(Millions of Dollars) 
Total Tax Liability 
Compromised 
(Millions of Dollars) 
Amount Accepted as 
Percentage of Total 
Tax Liability 
1997 295.0 1986.8 15 
1998 290.1 1971.2 15 
1999 311.6 2355.6 13 
2000 316.2 2586.9 12 
2001 340.8 2688.7 13 
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IRS SHOULD EVALUATE THE CHANGES TO ITS OFFER IN 
COMPROMISE PROGRAM, GAO-02-311, at 39 (March 2002), available at LEXIS, 2002 TNT 
60-22, at ¶ 94 app. I tbl.5. 
191 Smith, supra note 78, at 244 fig.2, 245. 
192 Id. at 240 fig.1, 241; see also Alm & Martinez-Vazquez, supra note 119, at 151. 
If the perception becomes widespread that the government is not willing to detect and 
penalize evaders, then such a perception legitimizes tax evasion. The rejection of sanctions 
sends a signal to each individual that others do not wish to enforce the tax laws and that tax 
evasion is in some sense socially acceptable, and the social norm of compliance 
disappears. Such an outcome is common in many countries, such as the Philippines and 
Italy . . . . 
Id.  
In an oft-cited observation, Chester Bowles, the Administrator of the Office of Price 
Administration during the Second World War, asserted that twenty percent of the 
regulated community will automatically comply with any regulation just because it is the 
law, five percent will seek to evade the regulation, and the remaining seventy-five percent 
will comply as long as they believe that the evading five percent will be caught and 
punished.  
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Empirical evidence more generally does not support Professor Kahan’s 
assertion that increased penalties undermine compliance.193 Studies have found 
that the fear of sanctions increases tax compliance.194 An IRS study found that 
audits increase reporting compliance; “the average indirect effect of . . . audits 
started in 1991 was about 11.7 times as large as the average adjustment directly 
proposed by audits closed that year.”195  
 
Vandenbergh, supra note 115, at 129 (citing EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING 
BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 65 (1982) (citing CHESTER 
BOWLES, PROMISES TO KEEP: MY YEARS IN PUBLIC LIFE, 1941–1969 25 (1971))). 
193 See Blackwell, supra note 74, at 14 (meta-analysis of available studies finds positive 
effect of sanction rate on compliance); Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein, supra note 10, at 841.  
Experimental studies consistently show that both the penalty rate and the probability of 
audit have a positive influence on compliance, in accordance with theory. However, Alm, 
Jackson, and McKee . . . find that when these variables are set at levels consistent with 
those observed in practice their deterrent effect is quite small. 
Id. (footnote omitted) (citations omitted); see also supra note 79.  
194 See Mason & Calvin, supra note 78, at 493 (analysis of results of survey of Oregon 
taxpayers found that “[s]anction fear . . . is strongly related to compliance . . . .”); Spicer, supra 
note 1, at 15 (citing studies).  
In the Schwartz and Orleans study, one group was asked a series of questions focusing on 
possible sanctions for tax evasion, another group was asked a series of questions focusing on 
conscience-based reasons for tax compliance, and a third group was asked only the basic 
interview questions, not the tax compliance questions. A fourth group was not interviewed. See 
Schwartz & Orleans, supra note 62, at 286–88. Among other things, the study looked at the first 
response to an open-ended question about reasons for paying taxes. The taxpayers with the 
highest socio-economic status (by occupation and education) were quite responsive to the threat 
of sanction but not to the moral appeal. Id. at 290–91. The group with the lowest socio-
economic status showed the opposite trend, responding positively to the moral appeal and 
slightly negatively to the sanction interview. Id. The study also considered the taxpayers’ 
difference in federal income tax after credits reported for 1961 and 1962. See id. at 296 tbl.V. 
The sanction threat increased income tax after credits by $11, which compared favorably to 
decreases in the two control groups but was substantially lower than the $243 for the group 
exposed to the conscience appeal. See id. 
195 Alan H. Plumley, The Impact of the IRS on Voluntary Tax Compliance: Preliminary 
Empirical Results ¶ 19 (Nov. 14, 2002), available at LEXIS, 2002 TNT 224-22 (IRS paper 
presented at the National Tax Association 95th Annual Conference on Taxation) [hereinafter, 
Plumley, Impact of the IRS]. Plumley found that “if the AuditRate had been one percentage 
point higher in 1991, the general population would have reported an additional $56 billion of 
additional tax voluntarily.” Id. The “AuditRate” variable was defined as the number of district 
audits started in the fiscal year in question divided by the number of returns filed in the prior tax 
year. Id. at tbl.1. The AuditRate for 1991 in the Plumley study was .65%. Alan H. Plumley, The 
Determinants of Individual Income Tax Compliance: Estimating the Impacts of Tax Policy, 
Enforcement, and IRS Responsiveness, I.R.S. Publication 1916, at 36 (November 1996) 
[hereinafter, Plumley, Determinants of Compliance].  
An earlier study that used different methodology found that the indirect effect of audits 
was responsible for six out of every seven dollars of revenue. See Jeffrey A. Dubin, Michael A. 
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The intuitive notion that the threat of audit increases compliance for most 
taxpayers is also supported by the results of the study conducted by the Minnesota 
Department of Revenue.196 That study tested five compliance strategies, 
including audits with prior notice to taxpayers that their returns would be “closely 
examined.”197 Taxpayers were randomly selected for inclusion in the five 
experimental groups and parallel control groups.198 The study measured the 
impact of the compliance strategies tested by comparing 1993 and 1994 reported 
income and taxes paid by each taxpayer in the study.199  
Taxpayers in the “audit group” of the Minnesota study were sent a letter 
stating that they had been selected to participate in a study that would “increase 
 
Graetz & Louis L. Wilde, The Effect of Audit Rate on the Federal Individual Income Tax, 
1977–1986, 43 NAT’L TAX J. 395, 405 (1990). However, that study did not directly measure 
noncompliance. See MARSHA BLUMENTHAL, CHARLES CHRISTIAN & JOEL SLEMROD, THE 
DETERMINANTS OF INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE: EVIDENCE FROM A CONTROLLED EXPERIMENT IN 
MINNESOTA 11 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 6575, 1998), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w6575.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2003). It could not distinguish 
changes in IRS collections due to the audit rate from those due to changes in the economy or in 
the tax law. Id. The Dubin, Graetz and Wilde study found that by 1986, if the audit rate had 
stayed at the level it was at in 1977, total reported tax would have increased by 15.6 billion 
1986 dollars. Dubin, Graetz & Wilde, supra, at 404. Of course, these studies do not show 
whether the indirect effect of audits was due to deterrence, securing a compliance norm, or 
some combination of the two. 
196 This does not necessarily mean that the threat of audit buttressed compliance norms, 
however. 
To determine the effect of an audit on subsequent compliance, one study used a data set 
consisting of taxpayers subject to a non-random audit in 1980 or 1981 and a TCMP audit in 
1982; taxpayers subject to a non-random audit in 1983 or 1984 and a TCMP audit in 1985; and 
taxpayers subject to a TCMP audit in 1982 or 1985 but no audit in 1980, 1981, 1983, or 1984. 
See Brian Erard, The Influence of Tax Audits on Reporting Behavior, in WHY PEOPLE PAY 
TAXES 95, 98–99 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992). First, the study considered whether taxpayers with 
tax changes in a prior audit had lower tax changes upon TCMP audit than other taxpayers. It 
found that a “substantial proportion of taxpayers demonstrate improvements in compliance 
following a large audit assessment.” Id. at 113. However, this result did not establish whether 
the prior audit was a positive influence because it is consistent with regression to the mean. Id. 
The study then compared compliance of taxpayers who had experienced a prior audit with 
taxpayers who had not, controlling for a variety of factors. Id. at 101. This method did not find a 
positive relationship between a prior audit and compliance without adding the assumption that 
taxpayers audited in one year are more likely to be noncompliant in future years than taxpayers 
who were not audited. Id. at 113. 
197 Coleman, supra note 34, at 1. A total of 4 different letters were mailed to taxpayers, 
not including the letter sent with the “test form” booklet. See id. at 48–52.  
198 Id. at 1, 7. The selected taxpayers were chosen from taxpayers who were full-year 
Minnesota residents in 1993, filed a 1993 return in 1994 that had been processed by September 
1994, and with respect to whom federal income tax data were also available. Id. at 1. Amended 
returns were not included. Id.  
199 Id.  
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the number of taxpayers whose 1994 individual returns are closely examined,” 
that their 1994 state and federal returns would be examined by the Minnesota 
Department of Revenue, that they would be contacted about any discrepancies, 
and that discovery of “irregularities” might lead to examination of their prior 
years’ returns, as well.200 Minnesota did carry through on the threat.201  
The study found that the threat of audit increased reported income and taxes 
paid for low and middle-income taxpayers, about 96.7% of the population.202 The 
study also compared taxpayers in “high-risk” and “low-risk” sub-groups, with the 
high-risk group designed to be taxpayers with income not subject to 
withholding.203 When low and middle-income taxpayers were subdivided into 
low-risk and high-risk groups, the high-risk groups showed a greater increase in 
reported taxes, averaging $186 more than the controls, compared to $36 for the 
low-risk group.204 Overall, once the results were weighted to make the sample 
proportional to the underlying population, the average tax increase in for low and 
middle-income taxpayers in the audit letter group over the controls was $41,205 
which, for the population of Minnesota, would amount to $73 million.206 
In fact, the results of the Minnesota study suggest that some taxpayers 
respond more positively to the threat of audit and some respond more positively 
to normative appeals.207 Overall, the experimenters concluded that “the 
 
200 Id. at 3. 
201 The Minnesota Department of Revenue also audited other taxpayers that year, but not 
with respect to their 1994 returns. E-mail from Leandra Lederman, Professor of Law, George 
Mason University School of Law, to Steve Coleman, Adjunct Professor, Metropolitan State 
University, Doctoral Faculty, Graduate School of Public Administration, Hamline University 
(on file with author). 
202 Coleman, supra note 34, at 10–12, 22. This was defined as 1993 federal AGI of below 
$10,000 and $10,000 to $100,000, respectively. Id. at 11. 
203 More technically, it was defined as filing of a federal Schedule C (for self-employment 
income) or Schedule F (for farm income) in 1993 and payment of Minnesota estimated taxes in 
1993. Id. at 2. Minnesota required taxpayers to make quarterly estimated tax payments if 
expected income will exceed withholding and tax credits by $500 or more. Id. at 2. The 
inclusion of this factor was designed to exclude those with a small business or farm with little 
income from it. Id. However, this could result in misclassifying as low-risk, taxpayers who 
evade taxes by not filing a Schedule C or F that they should, or by not paying estimated taxes 
that are actually due. 
204 Id. at 12.  
205 Id. at 12, 22. 
206 Stephen Coleman, Income Tax Compliance: A Unique Experiment in Minnesota, 
GOV’T FIN. REV., Apr. 1997, at 11. The audit letter had mixed results, possibly negative overall, 
on the high-income group (defined as 1993 federal AGI of over $100,000). Coleman, supra 
note 34, at 11.  
207 Coleman, supra note 34, at 24–25. The audit letter apparently had an overall negative 
effect on taxpayers who had paid a penalty with respect to their 1993 federal income taxes, and 
the higher the penalty, the larger the negative effect. Id. at 20–21. It may be that this increases 
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examination and information strategies motivated different segments of the 
taxpayer population.”208 For example, the audit letter had mixed results, possibly 
negative overall, on the high-income group209 (defined as 1993 federal adjusted 
gross income of more than $100,000210). This may be because sophisticated 
taxpayers believe that the tax paid on audit depends on a negotiation process so 
that it is best to begin with a low “opening bid.”211 The experimenters were 
unable to determine the dollar impact of any negative effect.212 
Might the threat of audit undermine a normative appeal? The evidence 
suggests the contrary. First, the subgroup of Minnesota’s compliance norm group 
whose returns had been adjusted the prior year reported $278 more in tax than the 
controls,213 suggesting that enforcement combined with normative appeal can be 
a particularly potent combination.214 Second, with respect to taxpayers who had 
had an adjustment of their prior year’s taxes, both the audit letter and the 
compliance norm letter increased the amount of income reported and of taxes 
paid.215 This is consistent with a study of 1982 and 1985 IRS data by Brian Erard, 
which found that there was a strong tendency for taxpayers who had experienced 
 
the adversarial nature of the process, encouraging some taxpayers to view their return as the 
opening move in a game, see infra note 211 and accompanying text, or perhaps those taxpayers 
were trying to recoup the amount of the penalty they paid, cf. Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein, 
supra note 10, at 843–44 (discussing study in which the effect of a prior audit was small and 
statistically insignificant and suggesting, among other possibilities, that taxpayers “want to 
evade by more in the future in an attempt to ‘get back’ at the tax agency”). 
208 Coleman, supra note 206, at 14.  
209 Coleman, supra note 34, at 12–13. 
210 Id. at 11. 
211 Blumenthal, Christian & Slemrod, supra note 195, at 21. The authors reject the 
possibilities that it was primarily due to differential dropout rates in the experimental and 
control groups or increased use of tax preparers to find “legal” ways to minimize tax liability. 
See id. at 20–21 & n.15. 
212 Coleman, supra note 34, at 13. The effects of the audit letter are inconsistent with the 
results of a study of TCMP data in the 1980s. See HELEN V. TAUCHEN, ANN DRYDEN WITTE & 
KURT J. BARON, TAX COMPLIANCE: AN INVESTIGATION USING INDIVIDUAL TCMP DATA 17, 
31 tbl.1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 3078, 1989), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w3078.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2003) (finding small but positive 
effects of audits on reported income by taxpayers in all of their income groups (which excluded 
taxpayers reporting significant business income) but statistically significant effects only on 
high-income taxpayers, defined as those with income over $50,000). 
213 Coleman, supra note 34, at 25.  
214 In addition, the audit threat letter was publicized by Minnesota media. Id. at 3. The 
experimenters were uncertain of the effect of the media coverage but argued that it likely 
increased the credibility of the audit threat. Id. However, it is also possible that those who 
received the norms letter got the impression from media reports that audits were increasing.  
215 Id. at 20. 
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substantial prior year audit assessments to increase compliance.216  
Another relevant data point with the respect to the impact of enforcement is 
the effect on voluntary compliance of criminal convictions for tax evasion, which 
the IRS publicizes.217 The economic model of tax compliance suggests that the 
possibility of criminal sanction should increase tax compliance.218 However, 
some have argued that publicizing convictions for tax evasion may have a 
deleterious effect on compliance.219 For example, Professor Joshua Rosenberg 
 
216 See Erard, supra note 196, at 105 (using data from the Taxpayer Compliance 
Measurement Program). In the Minnesota study, the effect for both the audit letter group and 
the compliance norm letter group was stronger when the adjustment had been in favor of the 
taxpayer. See Coleman, supra note 34, at 20. 
217 Publicity has the important effect of increasing the perceived risk of tax evasion 
because individuals tend to use an “availability” heuristic, viewing as more frequent events that 
are more easily recalled than other events, even if they are in fact less frequent. See AMOS 
TVERSKY & DANIEL KAHNEMAN, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in 
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 11 (Daniel Kahneman et al. ed., 
1982) (“a class whose instances are easily retrieved will appear more numerous than a class of 
equal frequency whose instances are less retrievable”); cf. Melia, supra note 68, at 1310–11. 
218 Shame is also an important factor. In some private extra-legal systems, shame is used 
as a tool to encourage compliance with group norms. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out Of the 
Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations In the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 
115 (1992). Some states publish the names of tax evaders on the internet as a public shaming 
device. See, e.g., Minnesota Revenue DelinqNet, at http://www.taxes.state.mn.us/taxes/ 
mce/delinqnet/delinqnet_overview.shtml (last visited Oct. 24, 2003) (Minnesota’s public list of 
delinquent taxpayers); Louisiana Department of Revenue, at http://www.rev.state.la.us/ 
sections/cybershame/default.asp (last visited Oct. 24, 2003) (Louisiana’s “cybershame” list); 
see also Department of Revenue Services, at http://www.drs.state.ct.us/delinq/top100.html (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2003) (listed one hundred most wanted tax evaders as a law-enforcement tool). 
The GAO found that “Revenue office officials from the four states [with public disclosure 
programs at the time] and the District of Columbia believe that their programs have improved 
or will improve compliance. However, officials are unable to isolate the gain in revenue 
collections directly attributable to their programs.” GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEW STATE AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS PUBLICLY DISCLOSE DELINQUENT TAXPAYERS, GAO/GGD-99-165, at 2 
(Aug. 1999), available at LEXIS, 1999 TNT 164-14, at ¶ 5. For more on public shaming of tax 
evaders, see Stephen W. Mazza, Taxpayer Privacy and Compliance, 51 KAN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2003). 
219 Sheffrin and Triest make a more nuanced claim, arguing that publicity of tax cases 
involving Al Capone, Pete Rose, and Leona Helmsley might have different effects on public 
attitudes. See Sheffrin & Triest, supra note 175, at 210. As another example, Willie Nelson was 
the object of sympathy for his tax troubles. See Robert Draper, Poor Willie, TEX. MONTHLY 
MAG., May 1991, available at http://www.texasmonthly.com/archive/irs.php (last visited Oct. 
24, 2003). H&R Block featured him in an ad for its “Double Check Challenge,” which 
premiered during the 2003 Superbowl. Just Sell, Baby; Ad Agencies Take Their Best Shot in 61 
Super Bowl Commercials, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 19, 2003, at G3. 
Another article states: 
[T]he deterrent effect is open to question. In interviews conducted informally some years 
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has argued:  
In our country, the models for tax evasion are often wealthy, important, and 
successful people. Unfortunately, when we hear about Leona Helmsley evading 
taxes and going to jail, some of us say to ourselves “we had better pay our taxes,” 
but many others tend to engage in an internal dialogue that sounds more like 
“this rich woman evaded her taxes; from what I hear, most other rich people do, 
and probably I should or I’ll be losing out.”220 
Of course, this is speculation.221 More helpful is the IRS voluntary 
compliance study, which found, among other results, that states with a higher 
proportion of criminal tax convictions demonstrated higher reporting 
compliance.222 In addition, publicity about specific individuals does not seem to 
have the same negative effects as publicizing the “tax gap,” which may imply to 
taxpayers that cheating is rampant.223 Furthermore, “[t]he IRS . . . found that 
 
ago, a few instances were found in which tax violations began after the prosecution of a 
widely publicized case. The primary reasons given were that the convicted offender had 
been incredibly stupid and that his evasions had been of major proportions. “If that is the 
kind of thing the government waits for,” said one informant, “they’ll never come after 
me.” 
Schwartz & Orleans, supra note 62, at 276 (footnote omitted). The quotation indicates that it 
involved informal interviews rather than a rigorous study. There is no indication whether the 
“few instances” were representative or not.  
220 Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 199; cf. Wenzel, supra note 34, at 17 (“Certainly, cases of 
salient public figures, wealthy individuals and powerful companies who manage to dodge their 
tax responsibilities can quickly undermine the impact of the public’s tax morality.”).  
221 It is also possible that it matters whether there is routine publicity of “run of the mill” 
cases or whether publicity is limited to cases involving famous people, such as Leona 
Helmsley. Cf. Schwartz & Orleans, supra note 62, at 276 (offering anecdotal evidence of 
disincentive to comply following publicity where “the convicted offender had been incredibly 
stupid and . . . his evasions had been of major proportions”). There are a number of examples of 
publicity of routine cases in the employment tax area of the IRS’s CID web site. See I.R.S. 
Criminal Investigation, at http://www.treas.gov/irs/ci/tax_fraud/docemploymenttax.htm (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2003). 
222 Plumley, Determinants of Compliance, supra note 195, at 36. The variable that 
Plumley used was number of criminal tax convictions per census population, using data 
aggregated to the state level. See id. at 7, 14. The Plumley study did not control for the effects of 
possible state-by-state differences in the level of publicity of convictions. The study found that 
criminal tax convictions were the least cost-effective tool for voluntary compliance of the seven 
IRS actions studied. Id. at 40. However, the study pointed out that “a realistic expansion of CID 
activities may produce more indirect revenue than the largest realistic expansion of TDI 
[Taxpayer Delinquency Investigation] Notices [a nonfiler program]—even though TDI Notices 
are the most cost-effective activity in producing indirect revenue.” Id. That is, TDI Notices are 
already widely used.  
223 See Sheffrin & Triest, supra note 175, at 210–11; Leslie Book, The Poor and Tax 
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taxpayers who heard about IRS audit activity via the media [rather than through 
word of mouth] were less likely to cheat . . . .”224 That may be because “word of 
mouth” reports about tax audits may focus on the taxpayer’s “success” in the 
audit, while media reports are unlikely to contain indications that audits do not 
uncover all cheating.225 Thus, the evidence suggests that sanctions do have a 
positive effect on tax compliance.226 
What effect do sanctions have on reciprocal or cooperative behavior? Some 
have argued that incentives or sanctions may convey the message that others are 
not inclined to contribute voluntarily.227 In other words, perhaps punishment will 
crowd out cooperative behavior.228 In the tax compliance context, Professor 
 
Compliance: One Size Does Not Fit All, 51 KAN L. REV. (forthcoming 2003); supra text 
accompanying notes 176, 186–88.  
224 Melia, supra note 68, at 1311 n.3. 
225 One study found that “personal knowledge of someone with difficulties with the IRS 
results in a sizable (and statistically significant) decrease in the perceived probability of 
detection.” Sheffrin & Triest, supra note 175, at 206. Sheffrin and Triest speculate that 
taxpayers with this knowledge may conclude that it is “relatively easy to successfully ‘hide’ 
income from the IRS . . . .” Id. Another study found that people with personal experience with 
IRS contacts rate the IRS more favorably with respect to procedural fairness and outcome than 
those who have heard about experiences with the IRS from others. See Karyl A. Kinsey, 
Deterrence and Alienation Effects of IRS Enforcement: An Analysis of Survey Data, in WHY 
PEOPLE PAY TAXES 271 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992).  
[T]he minority of taxpayers who think the IRS treated them unfairly may vent their anger 
by talking in more detail and to more people than taxpayers who evaluate the IRS’s 
performance more favorably. In addition, taxpayers who agree with IRS assertions that 
their tax returns were noncompliant may be reluctant or feel ashamed to talk about the 
results of their contacts with others. If they do talk about the contact, they may attempt to 
save face and minimize their own culpability by criticizing the IRS’s performance. 
Id. at 281. 
226 In contrast, studies show that service provided to taxpayers by a revenue authority 
does not seem to have an effect on compliance. See Coleman, supra note 34, at 16 (Minnesota 
study); Plumley, Determinants of Compliance, supra note 195, at 37–39; Lederman, supra note 
6 (forthcoming 2003) (discussing this issue in more detail).  
227 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
228 See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text. Sheffrin and Triest state, “tax 
administrators need to worry about any factors that might shift social norms and perceptions 
regarding evasion. . . . Some types of enforcement, such as audits, may also negatively affect 
attitudes by creating an adversarial relationship between the taxpayer and the IRS.” Sheffrin & 
Triest, supra note 175, at 214; see also Frey & Feld, supra note 39, at 6–7 (“[W]hen the tax 
officials consider taxpayers purely as ‘subjects’ who have to be forced to pay their dues, the 
taxpayers tend to respond by actively trying to avoid taxation.”). Professor Posner has argued, 
based on his signaling model of tax compliance, that:  
Very generous, even wastefully generous, procedures are signals that IRS officials, or their 
political superiors, belong to the good type. The more wasteful the procedures are, the 
better. Face-to-face contact, hand-holding, generous rights to appeal, restrictions on the use 
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Kahan has argued that: 
the reciprocity theory helps to explain why such [audit] threats have sometimes 
been shown to backfire. When the IRS engages in dramatic gestures to make 
individuals aware that it is redoubling its efforts to catch and punish tax evaders, 
it also causes individuals to infer that more taxpayers than they thought are 
choosing to cheat.  This inference in turn triggers a reciprocal motive to evade, 
which dominates the greater material incentive to comply associated with the 
higher than expected penalty. Because it misunderstands the contribution that 
social norms make to tax evasion, the conventional strategy suggests a self-
defeating strategy for dealing with it.229
The only authority cited in this paragraph is the Minnesota study, which does 
support the stated proposition.230
 
of confidential records, and other procedures—even, or especially, if tending only to 
hamper the IRS without giving the taxpayer concrete benefits—create warm feelings of 
trust in the heart of the taxpaying citizen.  
Posner, supra note 22, at 1800. However, empirical evidence suggests that IRS friendliness 
does not increase tax compliance. See Lederman, supra note 6 (forthcoming 2003). 
229 Kahan, supra note 11, at 380–81 (footnotes omitted) (citing Coleman, supra note 34, 
at 25). 
230 Kahan cites page 25 of the Minnesota study to support the sentence stating “When the 
IRS engages in dramatic gestures to make individuals aware that it is redoubling its efforts to 
catch and punish tax evaders, it also causes individuals to infer that more taxpayers than they 
thought are choosing to cheat.” See Kahan, supra note 11, at 380–81, n.56. Page 25 of the 
Minnesota study is the conclusion. It states, in part: 
The information message strategy of Letter 2 [the norms letter] remains a bargain even if 
the dollar estimates are too high by a wide margin. This also seems to be a strategy with 
few if any potential negative effects. It would complement an examination approach, 
because the analysis of 1993 balances for the experimental groups showed that the 
examination and information strategies generally motivated different segments of the 
taxpayer population. 
Coleman, supra note 34, at 25. 
Just before the paragraph quoted in the text, see supra text accompanying note 229, 
Professor Kahan states that “[c]onsistent with the reciprocity theory of collective action—and at 
odds with the conventional rational choice one—the Minnesota study also found that simply 
advising taxpayers that others were inclined to comply was more cost-effective than the threat 
of an audit!” Kahan, supra note 11, at 380 (citing Coleman, supra note 34, at 24–25). This is 
true as far as it goes. However, the audit threat generally did produce a greater return than the 
norms letter. See Coleman, supra note 34, at 11 tbl.1, 12 (weighted average increase in taxes for 
low and middle-income taxpayers in the audit group—the vast majority of that group—was $41 
more per return than the control group but was likely negative for high-income taxpayers in that 
group); id. at 12 (weighted average difference between 1994 balances of the low and middle-
income taxpayers in audit group and control group was $51); id. at 19 (“The difference between 
average 1994 balances of the Letter 2 group and the control group was $12.”). The greater cost-
effectiveness of the norms letter was because the Minnesota Department of Revenue actually 
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Contrary to the assertion that sanctions may undermine cooperative behavior, 
sanctioning people who do not contribute to public goods can reassure others that 
they will not be “chumps” if they contribute.231 As discussed above, the presence 
of free riders lowers average contributions in a public goods game, and in 
response, conditional cooperators lower their own contributions.232 This suggests, 
that contrary to the notion that sanctions crowd out voluntary contributions, the 
possibility of punishing free riding may help maintain the average contribution 
level and thereby maintain contributions.233
 
followed through on the audit threat, see id. at 1 (describing this strategy as an “increased 
examination and audit rate of tax returns with prior notice to taxpayers”) and audits are costly, 
see id. at 3 (“Because an examination . . . was the most costly intervention in the experiment, 
the sample was limited to the minimum size required.”). Minnesota did not specify the cost of 
audit. However, a recent New York Times article reported that a planned increase in audits of 
individuals who make more than $100,000 would cost approximately $3,200 per audit. David 
Cay Johnston, Bush Budget Increases Push to Find Tax Cheats, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2003, at 1.  
Thus, the Minnesota study found that the low cost of sending a letter was justified by a 
small increase in reported taxes. See Coleman, supra note 34, at 25. 
Letter 2 also had a modest positive effect on the whole population and a somewhat more 
concentrated effect on a large subgroup (H) that represented 36 percent of the population. 
Although the $48 average gain in taxes in subgroup H is small, the low cost of sending 
letters or, perhaps, using advertising methods, combined with the large number of 
potentially responsive taxpayers make this a viable option to increase compliance.  
Id. However, given the much higher cost of audits, audits should be targeted to those where 
there was a likelihood of a relatively high return. See id. at 24 (suggesting that an auditing 
program might be appropriate for the high-risk, mid-income taxpayers, where the average tax 
increase was $700). 
231 See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
Arguably, the offer-in-compromise program may undermine taxpayer assurance that 
others are paying their tax obligations, by letting taxpayers who legally owe taxes compromise 
those obligations for a small fraction of the liability. The following table provides a time trend 
of the offer-in-compromise program: 
 
Fiscal Year 
Amount Accepted in 
Compromise 
(Millions of Dollars) 
Total Tax Liability 
Compromised 
(Millions of Dollars) 
Amount Accepted as 
Percentage of Total Tax 
Liability 
1997 295.0 1986.8 15 
1998 290.1 1971.2 15 
1999 311.6 2355.6 13 
2000 316.2 2586.9 12 
2001 340.8 2688.7 13 
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IRS SHOULD EVALUATE THE CHANGES TO ITS OFFER IN 
COMPROMISE PROGRAM, GAO-02-311, at 39 (March 2002), available at LEXIS, 2002 TNT 
60-22, at ¶ 94 app. I tbl.5. 
232 See Camerer & Fehr, supra note 126, at 11; supra text accompanying notes 161–63.  
233 See Camerer & Fehr, supra note 126, at 11. 
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In fact, experiments find that when players can punish defectors—at a cost to 
themselves—that dramatically increases cooperation in a public goods game.234 
These experiments suggest that, in addition to players who are conditional 
cooperators, there are players who are “willing punishers.”235 In addition, one 
study found that the players who initially were the least trusting are the most 
likely to become strong cooperators in the presence of a sanctioning 
mechanism.236 Thus, the awareness of the possibility of sanction from evasion 
does not create a climate in which players free ride—quite the opposite.237  
Of course, those games involved punishment by other players rather than by 
a third party, such as a tax collector. However, a prisoner’s dilemma game 
involving punishment by a third party found only slightly weaker effects than 
where punishment by other players was permitted.238 The third-party punisher in 
that experiment was someone who had previously played the game, rather than an 
“outsider” to the game, but it still suggests that sanctions may have a positive 
effect.239
 
234 See id. at 11–13; Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Cooperation and Punishment in Public 
Goods Experiments, 90 AMER. ECON. REV. 980 (2000); see also MARTIN SEFTON, ROBERT 
SHUPP & JAMES WALKER, THE EFFECT OF REWARDS AND SANCTIONS IN THE PROVISION OF 
PUBLIC GOODS 2 (Working Paper, 2002), available at http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/ 
cedex/papers/ssw-5-13-02.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2003) (sanctioning more effective than 
reward in sustaining contribution levels); cf. JAMES ANDREONI, WILLIAM HARBAUGH & LISE 
VESTERLUND, THE CARROT OR THE STICK: REWARDS, PUNISHMENTS AND COOPERATION 
(Working Paper, 2002), available at http://economics.uoregon.edu/papers/Harbaugh_UO-
2002-1_Carrot_Stick.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2003) (finding that the availability of both 
rewards and punishments has a dramatic effect on cooperation in a two-person game but that 
the availability of either alone has a much smaller effect). 
235 Ostrom, supra note 159, at 142. 
236 Id. at 141 (citing Fehr & Gächter, supra note 234). 
237 Camerer and Fehr point out:  
The public goods game with a punishment opportunity can be viewed as the 
paradigmatic example for the enforcement of a social norm. Social norms often demand 
that people give up private benefits to achieve some other goal. This raises the question of 
why most people obey the norm. The evidence above suggests an answer: Some players 
will punish those who do not obey the norm (at a cost to themselves), which enforces the 
norm. 
Camerer & Fehr, supra note 126, at 13. 
238 Id. at 21. In the study described, punishment could be administered by a non-player 
who had played the game in a previous round. Id. Retaliatory punishment was precluded by 
assuring that no player would have the role of punisher for someone who punished them. Id. 
239 An interesting follow-up experiment would be to determine what the effect is of the 
known availability of punishment by a tribunal consisting of an unchanging person or group of 
persons who do not play the underlying game. It would also be helpful to determine whether the 
tribunal administers punishment differently if its member(s) are compensated solely for 
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In sum, the speculation that sanctions for tax evasion will tend to undermine 
compliance does not seem to be supported by the evidence.240 In the experimental 
context, the availability of sanctions for failure to cooperate increases 
cooperation.241 In the tax compliance context, audits increase even compliance of 
those not threatened with audit.242 It is unclear how much of this is due only to 
deterrence, but a norm cannot be sustained if most people’s behavior does not 
comport with the norm.243 In other words, there is no stigma for behavior that 
everyone (or almost everyone) engages in.244 If enforcement keeps at least some 
people in line, it may help retain a critical mass245 of compliant taxpayers. 
Enforcement may therefore have the effect of deterring some people and 
increasing the robustness of a compliance norm for others by minimizing their 





showing up or if they are compensated based on aggregate contributions to a public good, with 
a partial subtraction for each punishment they administer. 
240 Cf. Vandenbergh, supra note 115, at 141–42. 
[L]ike debates over many other environmental issues, the enforcement debate has swung 
between two options—deterrence and cooperation—that are unnecessarily and unwisely 
regarded as mutually exclusive. That dynamic is reflected in and perpetuated by existing 
research, which often frames the basic decision about enforcement prescriptions as a 
choice between the approaches supported by either the deterrence model or the 
cooperation model. . . . Yet research framed by such a bi-polar model may not only be 
unenlightening, it also may produce misleading results. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
241 See supra text accompanying notes 233–39. 
242 See Plumley, Impact of the IRS, supra note 195. 
243 See Posner, supra note 22, at 1813 (“Something that everyone does—like speeding—
is not stigmatizing.”); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 
587 (1998) (“[A] norm exists when almost everyone in a community agrees that they ought to 
behave in a particular way in specific circumstances, and this agreement affects what people 
actually do.”). 
244 See Jack P. Gibbs, Preventive Effects of Capital Punishment Other than Deterrence, 
14 CRIM. LAW BULL. 34, 41 (1978) (“[A]n individual is not likely to persist in the 
condemnation of some type of act if he or she observes that the act is committed openly and 
frequently with impunity.”). 
245 See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 91–110 (1978) 
(explaining critical mass). 
246 Cf. Smith, supra note 78, at 247 (arguing that his “findings reinforce . . . that 
deterrence and normative commitment are, indeed, often symbiotic and complimentary 
strategies.”). 
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IV. USING ENFORCEMENT AND NORMS TO INCREASE TAX COMPLIANCE 
The discussion above has shown that enforcement of federal tax laws and 
norms of tax compliance are not inconsistent. In fact, both norms-based appeals 
and enforcement seem to increase tax compliance, though not necessarily with 
respect to the same taxpayers.247 There may be three general types of taxpayers, 
those that are committed to compliance, those that are susceptible to influence, 
and a few that are committed to noncompliance.248 The last category is probably 
small. It includes tax protestors, who generally assert that the federal income tax 
is unconstitutional or does not apply to them,249 and taxpayers with illegal 
income.250
The government can only hope to influence the second category. However, 
the techniques it uses may need to vary depending on the compliance level of the 
taxpayer segment in question. This Part discusses the application of enforcement 
and norms to (1) the generally compliant taxpayers under the jurisdiction of the 
Wage and Investment Income (W&I) Division and (2) the less compliant 
taxpayers, under the jurisdiction of the Small Business/Self-Employed Division, 
who own cash-based businesses. 
A. Wage and Investment Income 
Taxpayers in the W&I division do not present a major compliance 
problem.251 This is probably because of lack of opportunity to evade with respect 
to most of their income.252 However, some W&I taxpayers do have the 
 
247 The IRS has recently increased enforcement with respect to corporate tax shelters and 
offshore trusts, among other things. See Johnston, supra note 230; see also I.R.S. Department of 
the Treasury, at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=105689,00.html (last visited Oct. 
24, 2003) (“Offshore Voluntary Compliance Initiative”); I.R.S. News Release IR-2003-5 (Jan. 
14, 2003), available at LEXIS, 2003 TNT 10-11. 
248 Eric Posner refers to these groups of taxpayers as “mainstream,” “marginal,” and 
“deviant.” See Posner, supra note 22, at 1796. Larry Langdon, Commissioner of the Large and 
Mid-Sized Business Division of the IRS (LMSB) reportedly has referred to “white hats, gray 
hats and black hats.” See id. at 1795 (quoting David Cay Johnston, Corporations’ Taxes Are 
Falling Even as Individuals’ Burden Rises, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2000, at A36). 
249 For discussion of this phenomenon, see Johnston, supra note 86. 
250 See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
251 See Management Advisory Report: Comparing the Internal Revenue Service’s 
Verification of Income for Wage Earners and Business Taxpayers, Ref. No. 2001-30-166 at 4, 
Sept. 2001 [hereinafter 2001 Management Advisory Report]. 
252 See id. Interestingly, the IRS’s rate of follow-up on potential discrepancies identified 
through return matching apparently has declined over time. In 1992 (a high year), IRS 
personnel physically examined 45.8% of potential discrepancies. In 2000, IRS personnel 
physically examined only 20.6% of potential discrepancies. Transactional Records Access 
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opportunity to evade with respect to deductions and credits, and even with respect 
to income received from sources other than those subject to information 
reporting.253 Based on the results of the experiments in Minnesota and Australia, 
fostering a compliance norm should increase compliance by these taxpayers. If it 
can be done at low cost, such an initiative would likely more than pay for itself. 
Thus, with respect to these taxpayers, a letter suggesting that taxpayers 
generally are honest but that the IRS does enforce the law with respect to the 
minority that is not would likely be a good investment for the IRS. A letter is a 
relatively low-cost way for the government to reach a large group of taxpayers on 
an individual basis. The letter could be mailed either on its own or with the 
booklet containing Form 1040 and the instructions.254 The IRS could test a series 
of letters and then use more widely the letter that proves most successful.255
 
Clearinghouse, at http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/findings/national/ComputerMatch.html (last visited 
Oct. 24, 2003). 
253 See 2001 Management Advisory Report, supra note 251, at 4. 
254 It could even be printed on the front of the booklet. See Melia, supra note 68, at 1313 
(“The [Massachusetts Department of Revenue] Commissioner’s letter on the front page of the 
booklet of tax forms and instructions mailed annually to all taxpayers echoes [the] themes [of 
enforcement, service, and integrity efforts].”). This would decrease any delay between the 
points in time in which the taxpayer saw the letter and completed a return, possibly increasing 
the impact of the message. See Joshua D. Rosenberg, A Helpful and Efficient IRS: Some Simple 
and Powerful Suggestions, 88 KY. L.J. 33, 46–47 (1999/2000). Of course, many taxpayers do 
not use the booklets because they use tax preparers or tax preparation software. 
Professor Rosenberg has suggested that the IRS provide tax preparation software and that 
such a program contain a “pop-up helper” that explains, among other things, “the kinds of 
substantiation required by law, explain that taking the deductions without having the required 
records is fraudulent, and reveal the penalties for fraud at appropriate times during the process.” 
Id. at 42–43. However, at the margin, too much “propaganda” could prompt taxpayers to use 
privately developed tax preparation products such as the ones that currently exist.  
RRA ‘98 required the IRS to “use competitive market forces to increase electronic filing 
gradually over the next 10 years” and to “convene an electronic commerce advisory group to 
include representatives from the small business community and from the tax practitioner, 
preparer, and computerized tax processor communities and other representatives from the 
electronic filing industry.” See Pub. L. No. 105-206, 1001-9016, 112 Stat. 685 § 2001(b) 
(1998). On January 16, 2003, the IRS unveiled the “free file” initiative. See Plan to Offer Free 
Electronic Tax Filing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2003, at 12. This limits the prospect of the IRS 
developing tax preparation software. However, were it to develop such software, the message 
could appear on the first screen. 
255 The starting point could be Minnesota’s letter. A letter sent by the Massachusetts 
Department of Revenue may also be helpful. See Melia, supra note 68, at 1313 n.6. 
The letter [on the front page of the book of tax forms and instructions] is a sharp 
departure from the traditional Commissioner’s letter. Rather than cite minor and obscure 
changes in the tax laws, the letter develops many of the themes that research suggests are 
effective in influencing taxpayer behavior. The letter begins by thanking taxpayers and 
assuring them that taxpayer honesty is increasing. It goes on to say that because of that 
honesty, “more funding is available for vital state programs . . . and the tax burden is being 
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Supporting the letter campaign, the IRS could continue to publicize tax 
convictions to show that it does prosecute tax evaders.256 The overall message 
should not be that many people cheat, but rather that the IRS is successful at 
catching the few deliberate cheaters.257 The message could be explicit in that, in 
the publicity, the IRS could state something along the following lines: 
Most people file tax returns and report correctly and pay voluntarily the vast 
majority of the income taxes they owe. A small number of people who 
deliberately cheat owe the bulk of unpaid taxes. The IRS aggressively pursues 
that small group of tax evaders. The conviction of [name of tax evader] is an 
example of the IRS’s success in this effort.  
The press release could then proceed to give a skeleton outline of the facts of the 
conviction.  
Tax convictions publicized should not be limited to those involving 
underlying illegal activity or egregious acts of noncompliance; taxpayers may be 
more likely to identify with those who sound more like themselves.258 The 
 
distributed more equitably.” The letter concludes with a promise to redouble the 
“commitment to service” and warns that tax evaders will suffer from a “visible and 
vigorous crackdown.”  
Id.  
A carefully crafted letter could avoid the threat of audit while not implying lax 
enforcement. It could be worded in the first person and followed by the Commissioner’s 
signature. The letter should not mention the “tax gap” so as not to emphasize the magnitude of 
underpaid taxes: 
[O]n June 18, 1990, an Associated Press story began with a roadside vendor selling a 
watermelon for cash and a doctor and plumber engaging in a barter transaction. The story 
then turned to aggregate estimates of the “tax gap” that now hit the $100 billion mark. The 
overall impression from the story is that tax evasion is rampant. . . . It is our view that “tax 
gap” stories tend to be alarmist and defeatist and can breed public skepticism. 
See Sheffrin & Triest, supra note 175, at 211. Media coverage might heighten public awareness 
of the letter. See Coleman, supra note 34, at 3 (media covered Minnesota’s audit letter). 
256 The Internal Revenue Manual states, in part, “[t]ypically, the U.S. Attorney's office 
will issue press releases or hold press conferences at the conclusion of a [criminal] trial.” IRM 
9.3.2.7.2(1) (07-16-2002), available at www.irs.gov/irm. 
257 Publicity about specific individuals does not seem to have the same negative effects as 
publicizing the “tax gap,” which implies that cheating is rampant. See Sheffrin & Triest, supra 
note 175, at 210–11; Book, supra note 223 (forthcoming 2003); text accompanying notes 223–
224, supra. 
258 See American Bar Association Commission on Taxpayer Compliance, Report and 
Recommendation on Taxpayer Compliance, 41 TAX LAW. 329, 371 (1987); cf. Schwartz & 
Orleans, supra note 62, at 276. 
In interviews conducted informally some years ago, a few instances were found in which 
tax violations began after the prosecution of a widely publicized case. The primary reasons 
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following is an example from the employment tax area of the IRS’s CID web site:  
On December 12, 2002, in Pittsburgh, PA, John M. O’Shea, operator of a 
security company and former police officer, was sentenced to seven months in 
prison and seven months home detention, ordered to pay a $5,000 fine, and 
ordered to continue paying back taxes to the IRS. O’Shea pled guilty on August 
20, 2002, to making and subscribing to a false income tax return and failing to 
file income tax returns. O’Shea hired off-duty police officers and constables as 
security guards. He paid the majority of the guards with cash “under the table” 
and did not file Forms W-2 or withhold social security or federal income taxes. 
Under the plea agreement, O’Shea admitted to evading $230,000 in employee 
income tax payments from 1997–1998.259
B. Income from Small Businesses 
“Self-employed individuals engaged in business, the professions, and 
agriculture are sometimes collectively referred to as the ‘hard-to-tax.’ . . . As in 
other countries, self-employed individuals in the United States have a tradition of 
noncompliance, and studies have consistently shown them to be among the worst 
tax offenders.”260 The largest part of the tax gap is attributable to taxpayers under 
the jurisdiction of the Small Business and Self-Employed Division of the IRS 
(SB/SE),261 which includes individuals with business income and partnerships, S 
corporations, and C corporations with assets up to $10 million.262 In 1987, 
 
given were that the convicted offender had been incredibly stupid and that his evasions had 
been of major proportions. “If that is the kind of thing the government waits for,” said one 
informant, “they’ll never come after me.”  
Id. (footnote omitted). 
259 I.R.S. Criminal Investigation, at http://www.treas.gov/irs/ci/tax_fraud/docemployment 
tax.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2003). 
260 Piroska Soos, Self-Employed Evasion and Tax Withholding: A Comparative Study and 
Analysis of the Issues, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 107, 113–116 (1990). 
261 2001 Management Advisory Report, supra note 251, at 4. 
262 Currently, the complete jurisdiction of SB/SE is:  
[C]orporations, S corporations, and partnerships with assets less than or equal to $10 
million; estates and trusts; individuals filing an individual federal income tax return with an 
accompanying Schedule C (Profit or Loss from Business (Sole Proprietorship)), Schedule 
E (Supplemental Income and Loss), or Schedule F (Profit or Loss from Farming), or Form 
2106 (Employee Business Expenses) or Form 2106-EZ (Unreimbursed Employee Business 
Expenses); and individuals with international tax returns. 
Rev. Proc. 2003-2 § 1, 2003-1 IRB 76.  
When the SB/SE and LMSB divisions were established in late 2000, SB/SE taxpayers 
were defined, in part, to have up to $5 million in assets. Management Advisory Report: The 
Internal Revenue Service’s Response to the Falling Level of Income Tax Examinations and Its 
Potential Impact on Voluntary Compliance, Ref No. 2002-30-092 at 6 n.7 (June 2002) 
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unreported self-employment income alone was estimated to constitute 28.7% of 
the tax gap.263 SB/SE also accounts for the largest portion of accounts 
receivable,264 64% (approximately $168 billion), as of March 2001.265
There are a number of compliance problems for SB/SE, including the 
problem of matching of taxpayer returns to information returns from S 
corporations and partnerships266 and payment of employment taxes.267 SB/SE 
taxpayers with cash-based business also pose a reporting noncompliance problem.  
Taxpayers who own small businesses, including those who are self-
employed, are differently situated from other groups because, of those with 
income from legal sources, they have the greatest opportunity to evade. An 
important part of this is the prevalence of cash receipts.268 Cash businesses 
 
[hereinafter 2002 Management Advisory Report]. That number was changed to $10 million as 
of the beginning of fiscal year 2002. Id. In 2001, SB/SE had jurisdiction over approximately 40 
million taxpayers. Approximately 7 million of these were small business corporations and 
partnerships; the remaining 33 million were “self-employed and supplemental income earners.” 
Id. at 25–26. 
263 Compliance Estimates for Selected Types of Personal Income, IRS Research Division 
(1988), reprinted in SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 30, at 150. As another data point, in 1982, 
the proportion of returns understating net profit from business was 71.4%. See C. EUGENE 
STEUERLE, WHO SHOULD PAY FOR COLLECTING TAXES?: FINANCING THE IRS 44 tbl.4-2 (1986). 
Of the 31 items listed, this was the third most frequently underreported item. See id. at 44–45 
tbl.4-2. As Steuerle points out, the data do not necessarily mean that the self-employed are by 
nature less honest than other taxpayers; the self-employed simply have more opportunity to 
evade taxes without getting caught. Id. at 17.  
264 This is the terminology used by the 2001 Management Advisory Report. See 2001 
Management Advisory Report, supra note 251, at 7. This appears to be the same thing as 
delinquent accounts. 
265 Id. At that time, W&I taxpayers accounted for 28% (approximately $74 billion) and 
LMSB taxpayers accounted for 8% (about $21 billion). Id. 
266 See Lederman, supra note 6 (forthcoming 2003) (discussing this issue). 
267 See id. (discussing this issue). 
268 Another way a small business may cheat is by having the company provide personal 
services or pay for personal expenses. See 2 Robert A. Kagan, On the Visibility of Income Tax 
Law Violations, in TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE 105, 106, supra note 35. 
The self-employed face greater tax compliance burdens than do W&I taxpayers.  
[A]pproximately 32.5 million self-employed taxpayers spend about 1.9 billion hours 
complying with the federal income tax, or about 57.5 hours per taxpayer. In contrast, 
approximately 88 million taxpayers whose only income is from wages and investments 
spend 1.3 billion hours on tax compliance, or 14.5 hours per taxpayer. . . . [T]he 76.7 
million wage and investment income earners who incurred out-of-pocket costs on tax 
compliance spent somewhat more than $6.1 billion annually, or $79.92 per taxpayer, while 
30.8 million self-employed individuals incurred costs amounting to $10.2 billion, or 
$330.21 per taxpayer. 
Thomas F. Field, Herman A. Ayayo & Joe Thorndike, NTA Conferees Mull Future Tax Cuts, 
IRS Compliance Efforts, 97 TAX NOTES 1012, 1013 (2002).  
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present not only great opportunities for tax evasion but also a strong financial 
incentive to do so. In fact, in their fascinating article on cash business owners, 
Professors Joseph Bankman and Stuart Karlinsky report that one of the 
justifications used by cash business owners for underreporting is the need to do so 
to remain competitive.269 Because of rampant noncompliance in the cash 
business sector, “all else being equal, absent policy changes that lead to more 
accurate reporting (and a different before-tax return to labor and capital), an 
‘honest’ taxpayer should do worse in the cash sector than other taxpayers in that 
sector, and worse than she would do in the non-cash sector.”270  
This suggests that noncompliance in the cash business sector may be akin to a 
prisoner’s dilemma,271 with the dominant strategy being to cheat, assuming that 
the taxpayer does not simply leave the sector entirely.272 That is, even if penalties 
were high enough that cheating would be irrational when considered under the 
economic model discussed above, which considers the taxpayer in isolation, it 
might be rational for a taxpayer in a competitive market to evade.  
 
269 JOSEPH BANKMAN & STUART KARLINSKY, CASH BUSINESS OWNERS AND THEIR TAX 
PREPARERS 15 (NYU Colloquium on Tax Policy and Public Finance, Working Paper, 2001); 
see also Christopher Bergin, CID to Employment Tax Evaders: ‘We Will Catch You’, TAX 
ANALYSTS, May 15, 2001, available at LEXIS, 2001 TNT 94-9 (with respect to employment 
taxes, “some employers turn to evading taxes to stay competitive in their industry. It is 
apparently a serious problem in the construction industry”). 
270 BANKMAN & KARLINSKY, supra note 269, at 15. 
271 Professor William Eskridge explains the classic “prisoner’s dilemma” as follows: 
The prisoner’s dilemma consists of two prisoners, each of whom is offered a bargain: 
If you betray your colleague and he is loyal to you, you will get a benefit of eight (say a 
good plea bargain). Each prisoner knows that if he is loyal and his colleague betrays him, 
he will get no benefit (the other guy gets the plea bargain). Each prisoner also knows that if 
he is loyal and his colleague is also loyal, they each get a benefit of five (because there is a 
lower probability of conviction). However, if both prisoners betray one another, they both 
get a benefit of only two (each gets a bit of a deal). . . . The best joint strategy would be for 
both prisoners to be loyal (a joint benefit of ten, as compared to eight and four for other 
combinations). Yet under the circumstances of the prisoner’s dilemma game, each prisoner 
acting separately will tend to betray the other.  
William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Judicial Review Game, 88 NW. U.L. REV. 382, 389–90 (1993). 
Professor Eskridge further explains: “Acting rationally but not knowing what B will do, A faces 
possible benefits of two or eight if he betrays, but only zero or five, respectively, if he does not 
betray. Given such a choice, A will betray. B will also betray under the same reasoning.” Id. at 
389 n.29. Public goods games can be conceived of as prisoner’s dilemma games because each 
player’s rational move is not to contribute but total welfare is maximized if all players 
contribute. See Camerer & Fehr, supra note 126, at 9. 
272 Of course, taxpayer reports of the reasons for their activity might not be accurate or 
might not be generalizable. In addition, it is possible that a taxpayer who owns a cash business 
cheats so as to compete with a larger operation that does not cheat but has economies of scale 
(such as a national chain). If that is the case, increasing enforcement might drive inefficient 
cash-based businesses out of the market. 
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For example, assume, for simplicity, that there are only two businesses in the 
industry, one owned by Ann and the other owned by Bob, competitors who do 
not coordinate on prices.273 The baseline is compliance, which provides neither a 
benefit nor a detriment (thus, a zero payoff). Also assume that the financial 
benefits of cheating provide a benefit of 5 and that the costs of cheating are 
negative 6 (due to penalties and psychic costs of evasion, for example).274 
Assume further that if a particular taxpayer is the only one who cheats, he or she 
obtains a competitive benefit (by being able to lower prices) of 2 but that if only 
the taxpayer’s competitor cheats, the taxpayer has a detriment of minus 2. (If both 
cheat or both comply, there is no competitive benefit or disadvantage.) Thus, if 
Ann cheats and Bob complies, for example, Ann’s payoff would be 1 (composed 
of a benefit of 5 for cheating, a cost of -6 for cheating, and a competitive benefit 
of 2) while Bob’s payoff would be -2 (composed of 0 for compliance and a 
detriment of -2 for complying while Ann cheats). The matrix facing Ann and Bob 
would then be as follows: 
 Ann Complies Ann Cheats 
Bob Complies  0 (Ann), 0 (Bob)  1 (Ann), -2 (Bob) 
Bob Cheats -2 (Ann), 1 (Bob) -1 (Ann), -1 (Bob) 
This matrix suggests that the best strategy is for both Ann and Bob to comply 
(for an aggregate benefit of 0, rather than -1 if one of them cheats or -2 if both do) 
but, from each businessperson’s viewpoint, cheating has a higher payoff, no 
matter what the competitor does. For example, for Ann, if Bob complies, cheating 
has a higher payoff for her (1 rather than 0) and if Bob cheats, cheating also has a 
higher payoff for her (-1 rather than -2). The competitor (Bob) faces the same 
payoffs, so that cheating will be the dominant strategy despite its net negative 
payoff.275  
It is also possible that those inclined to cheat on their taxes opt 
disproportionately to start businesses, at least at the margin. In other words, 
sectors of the economy that provide a greater opportunity for tax evasion may 
draw more investment than they would in the absence of a tax system, potentially 
resulting in an inefficient allocation of resources.276 As an anecdotal example, 
                                                                                                                   
273 The model could be modified to treat the competitor as a group of competitors. 
274 See Skinner & Slemrod, supra note 10, at 345–46. 
275 Of course, if, contrary to the assumptions at the beginning of this example, the benefits 
of cheating outweighed the costs, the incentive to cheat would be dominant even without 
factoring in the competitiveness aspects of the decision. 
276 See Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein, supra note 10, at 824 (citing Pierre Pestieau & Uri 
Possen, Tax Evasion and Occupational Choice, 45 J. PUBLIC ECON. 107 (1991)); cf. Spicer, 
supra note 1, at 13 (“Certain less productive activities may become more attractive simply 
because they are easy to conceal from tax authorities.”); see also GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
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Professors Bankman and Karlinsky quote from an interview with a storekeeper 
who stated in the context of an interview about underreporting income, 
“Stockbroker buddy all he talks about is how pissed he is about the taxes, how he 
wants to go in business. People like him all want to be in business for one reason, 
the tax.”277  
As an illustration, assume that an individual faces a choice of working as an 
employee for a return of $100,000 before tax or as the owner of a cash business 
for a return of $90,000 before tax. In the absence of a tax system, the greater 
financial return would result from choosing to work as an employee. However, 
assuming that the self-employed can evade tax by failing to report half of their 
income, without detection, and assuming an applicable tax rate of a flat 30%, the 
after-tax return for an employee is $70,000,278 while the after-tax return from 
self-employment is $76,500.279 This simple example shows that greater ease of 
tax evasion in a particular sector of the economy, such as the cash business sector, 
can have allocative effects.280  
In addition, at the margin, because of the relatively greater ease of tax 
evasion, self-employment may tend to select for taxpayers predisposed to 
evasion. In fact, the entrepreneurial activity of starting a business also may select 
for people who are relatively more willing to bear risk than the general 
population. This suggests that there may be somewhat more of an evasion norm 
among the self-employed than among taxpayers generally.281 Furthermore, 
 
IRS MEASURES COULD PROVIDE A MORE BALANCED PICTURE OF AUDIT RESULTS AND COSTS, 
GAO REPORTS, GAO/GGD-98-128, at 12 n.15 (June 1998), available at LEXIS, 98 TNT 122-
25, at ¶ 15  [hereinafter GAO AUDIT REPORT] (“Some taxpayers choose investments or 
occupations that provide opportunities to evade taxes. With fewer evasion opportunities, 
taxpayers may use their resources more efficiently elsewhere in the economy.”). The reverse is 
also possible, however; an increased opportunity for evasion may simply increase allocation of 
resources to that activity to the optimal level. 
277 BANKMAN & KARLINSKY, supra note 269, at 8. Of course, this interview may be 
entirely unrepresentative of the general population. See also 1 JEFFREY A. ROTH, JOHN T. 
SCHOLZ & ANN DRYDEN WITTE, Understanding Taxpayer Compliance: Self-Interest, Social 
Commitment, and Other Influences, in TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE 71, 75 (Roth, Scholz & Witte, 
eds., 1989) (quoting participant in group discussion of tax compliance stating “I switched 
occupations because in my new work . . . I can take off [personal] car expenses, entertainment 
expenses, etc., which I couldn’t do before.”) (quoting Individual Income Tax Compliance 
Factors Study Qualitative Research Results, Prepared for the Internal Revenue Service, Westat, 
Inc., Feb. 4, 1980). 
278 $100,000 less the $30,000 tax. 
279 $45,000 (half of the income, untaxed) plus $31,500 ($45,000 less $13,500 in taxes). 
280 The lower-taxed sector will attract more capital until the return declines to the point at 
which the after-tax return is the same as in the other sector. See Skinner & Slemrod, supra note 
10, at 345.  
281 In other words, though the societal norm may be compliance, certain taxpayer 
segments may have a group norm of noncompliance. See Smith, supra note 78, at 236 n.12 (“In 
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taxpayers who know noncompliant taxpayers are less likely to be compliant.282 
That prospect may be reflected in an interview Professors Bankman and 
Karlinsky conducted with a self-employed couple who professed that they were 
compliant and used an accountant who would not cheat; they seemed “almost 
embarrassed” about their honesty.283
The tendency towards a group norm of evasion among the self-employed, 
coupled with financial incentives to evade that factor in the behaviors of others in 
the industry, suggests that a change in that norm may be necessary if the self-
employed are to become more compliant. A survey of Minnesota taxpayers found 
that normative beliefs about tax compliance are related to opportunity to evade.284 
It may therefore be possible to change normative commitments by reducing the 
opportunity for noncompliance, such as through increased enforcement of the tax 
laws.285 In fact, a study by Kent Smith found that the effect of deterrence is 
 
a survey of Minnesota taxpayers, we have found that normative commitments concerning 
noncompliance are related to structural opportunity, suggesting occupationally and financially 
structured subcultures that are more likely to condone noncompliance . . . .”) (citing Loretta J. 
Stalans, Kent Smith & Karyl A. Kinsey, When Do We Think About Detection? Structural 
Opportunity and Taxpaying Behavior, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 481 (1989)); see also 
BANKMAN & KARLINSKY, supra note 269, at 19 (“While misreporting is a norm among cash 
business, the practice is not uniform. . . . The fact that the Vs [a couple who run their own 
business] seemed almost embarrassed about their honest behavior may be taken as evidence of 
the norm with which they are in conflict.”); Kagan, supra note 268, at 90 (stating, in connection 
with reporting results of informal survey of house painters, “[t]he subculture to which they 
belong conveys disapproval of painters who ‘go straight’ and file information returns 
identifying subcontractors or employees to whom they make payments; filing information 
returns puts pressure on the recipients to file tax returns or report income more fully”). 
282 See Davis, Hecht & Perkins, supra note 79, at 40 (citing literature); see also Carroll, 
supra note 1, at 58 (quoting from “diary” kept by subject in tax compliance study who 
increased charitable deduction amount listed in order to increase refund: “My friends and I talk 
about this and all agree. We can’t see what the govt. is doing for us and we have no control over 
how the money is spent”). 
283 See BANKMAN & KARLINSKY, supra note 269, at 19. 
284 Stalans, Smith & Kinsey, supra note 281. Smith did not find that relationship in the 
results of the national survey conducted for the IRS. See Smith, supra note 78, at 236 n.12. 
285 A compliance initiative could focus on businesses receiving significant cash receipts, 
such as restaurants and retail stores. Comparison of the reporting of a particular business with 
the industry as a whole (particularly within that geographic area) can provide some, but limited, 
information. For example, if a particular restaurant reports only 70% of the average income or 
profit reported in the industry, does that suggest that the restaurant is noncompliant with its tax 
obligations or just unsuccessful? In industries where noncompliance is very common, industry 
norms likely will not be helpful to identify noncompliance. However, where possible 
noncompliance is revealed by an industry comparison, as in the restaurant example just above, 
the IRS could use sampling techniques to estimate the gross receipts of those businesses or 
pursue cases in which it has other evidence of noncompliance, such as informant information 
that the business owner does not report some cash receipts, or evidence that the business owner 
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stronger for individuals who have high opportunities not to comply and view 
noncompliance as normatively acceptable.286  
One model of tax compliance, consistent with both this theory and the notion 
of “conditional cooperators” suggests that a norm of compliance can gradually 
erode as enforcement decreases until the norm “tips”287 to one of 
noncompliance.288 Once there is a norm of noncompliance, the psychic costs of 
evasion are lower, so authorities likely will have to increase enforcement above 
the previous level to restore the previous level of compliance.289 In other words, 
 
lives beyond his reported income. Cf. I.R.C. § 7602(e) (requiring that the IRS have “a 
reasonable indication that there is a likelihood of such unreported income” before using 
“financial status or economic reality examination techniques”). 
Another possibility would be for a compliance initiative to focus on tax preparers used by 
cash-based businesses. Professors Bankman and Karlinsky found that underreporting is 
concentrated among a small group of tax preparers. See BANKMAN & KARLINSKY, supra note 
269, at 22–27. They also report that their survey found that dishonest preparers will help their 
clients falsify records that can withstand an audit. See id. at 28–45; see also 2 Robert A. Kagan, 
On the Visibility of Income Tax Law Violations, in TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE 107, supra note 35 
(discussing the phenomenon of two sets of books). SB/SE could begin by identifying tax 
preparers that have cash-based businesses as a significant portion of their clients. It could then 
investigate those preparers. That investigation might help uncover falsification of books and 
records that can be used to pursue the businesses that are evading taxes. Pursuing preparers 
might also help reduce the supply of expertly falsified books and records. 
286 Kent W. Smith, Integrating Three Perspectives on Noncompliance: A Sequential 
Decision Model, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 350, 364 tbl.1, 365 (1990). The study considered 
those taxpayers receiving, during the 1986 tax year in question, income that was not subject to 
information reporting (for reasons other than de minimis thresholds) as having higher 
opportunity for noncompliance and all others as having lower opportunity. Id. at 362. 
287 See SCHELLING, supra note 245, at 101–02 (explaining “tipping”). 
288 See Davis, Hecht & Perkins, supra note 79, at 56; see also Smith, supra note 78, at 
241. 
Perhaps less common [than a focus on tax complexity, fairness, and trust] is the prediction 
that the likelihood of catching small cheaters will also decrease the normative acceptability 
of cheating. . . . Citizens . . . are more likely to take their taxpaying obligations seriously if 
they perceive that the state does also. A primary indicator of the state’s interest is its 
concern with detecting and punishing noncompliance. 
Id. 
One study involving a prisoner’s dilemma game suggests that the removal of incentives to 
cooperate after the first game undermines subsequent cooperation, leaving the players worse off 
in the second game than a control group that had no incentives in the first game. See Norman 
Frohlich & Joe A. Oppenheimer, Experiencing Impartiality to Invoke Fairness in the n-PD: 
Some Experimental Results, 86 PUB. CHOICE 117 (1996). However, cooperation was higher in 
the first game among the group with incentives. The worst approach may therefore be to 
remove incentives once they are in place. 
289 Spicer, supra note 1, at 18. This is because of the theory of cognitive dissonance. That 
is, if a person acts inconsistently with his beliefs, he will be motivated to change either his 
beliefs or his behavior. See id.; see also supra note 82 (explaining cognitive dissonance). If he 
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the model suggests that it is difficult for the government to disturb an existing 
equilibrium reflecting a norm of noncompliance but that it can be done with 
increased enforcement.290 That is, there may be two stable equilibria, as shown in 
the following graphic of a possible compliance curve: 
 
At first blush, it would seem to be efficient for the IRS to increase 
enforcement so long as the return on that investment is positive. The graphic 
above suggests that in a case in which the government might be able to tip an 
industry from generally noncompliant to generally compliant, it might even be 
efficient to increase enforcement if the direct return on that investment is negative 
because the overall return on that investment would be positive if the investment 
continued until the tipping point. However, the question of the efficient level of 
enforcement is more complicated than that because it does not take into account 
the total costs to society of enforcement, which may include taxpayer substitution 
of unproductive activity for productive activity291 and increased taxpayer costs 
for covering up evasion.292
Assuming that those societal costs of additional audit activity are low, at least 
                                                                                                                   
changes his beliefs to suit tax evasion behavior, his psychic costs of evasion will have declined. 
See Spicer, supra note 1, at 18. 
290 See Davis, Hecht & Perkins, supra note 79, at 56, 63. Of course, the actual shape of 
the compliance curve is an empirical question; it may look very different than the curve shown 
in the text below. 
291 See supra note 10. 
292 Skinner & Slemrod, supra note 10, at 350. In other words, increasing enforcement to 
the point that the return on an addition dollar spent on enforcement yielded an additional dollar 
of revenue might result in an inefficiently large IRS. See id. 
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for the amount of additional enforcement that it is reasonable for the IRS to 
consider, the next question is the IRS’s return on investment in auditing small 
businesses. Surprisingly, the IRS apparently does not compile data on the return 
on its investment in enforcement.293 However, in June of 1998, the GAO 
produced a report that analyzed IRS data to try to obtain a measure this ratio.294 
The report used 1992 audits because, due to the delay between the start of an 
audit and actual collection of tax, it was too soon to see how much of the 
additional tax recommended after 1992 would be collected.295  
The GAO found that the collection to cost ratio counting only certain direct 
staff costs in the cost was 5 to 1 for individual business and 4 to 1 for small 
corporations.296 The GAO emphasized the need to be cautious in considering 
these ratios because “[i]f costs such as Collection's direct staff costs and IRS’ 
indirect costs could be included, the ratios would be smaller, and the differences 
by type of audit could change significantly. Direct staff time accounts for about 
half of all time charged by auditors; much of the remaining time produces indirect 
costs.”297 If accounting for indirect costs and the direct costs of Collection staff’s 
time doubled costs, that would result in ratio of 5 to 2 for individual business and 
4 to 2 for small corporations or, put another way, every dollar the IRS spent on 
auditing individual business would yield an additional $2.50 of revenue collected 
 
293 See George Guttman, Measuring the Effectiveness of the Internal Revenue Service, 89 
TAX NOTES 1102, 1103 (2000) (“One of the main tools the IRS uses to assure compliance is the 
audit. Yet, the IRS does not know what the cost-benefit ratio of its audits are.”). In fact, the 
General Accounting Office has criticized the IRS for failing to collect this information. See 
GAO AUDIT REPORT, supra note 276, at ¶ 27. The Report states: 
IRS does not use its available data to develop and report measures that would provide a 
fuller, more balanced picture of audit results. For example, data on taxes recommended 
could be balanced with data on taxes assessed and collected in reporting audit results. . . . 
In developing these measures, such revenue data could be related to information on the 
costs of audits. In addition, IRS has the capacity to track more data beyond the direct staff 
costs. 
Id. 
294 GAO AUDIT REPORT, supra note 276. 
295 Id. 
296 Id. at tbl.3. In contrast, the ratio for individual non-business was 8 to 1 and for large 
corporations was 10 to 1. Id. A small corporation was defined as one with less than $10 million 
in assets. Id. at n.8. 
The Plumley study shows that the average direct return on audit for the 1991 period was 
6.2 to 1. See Plumley, Determinants of Compliance, supra note 195, at 86, fig. H-1. There was 
variation between business and non-business returns, as well as by income level. See id. The 
Plumley study found that a 23.3% increase in audits above the 1991 level would cost $191.4 
million and yield $10 billion more tax. Plumley, Impact of IRS, supra note 195, at tbl.3B. Those 
are overall figures, not separated out by type of taxpayer. 
297 GAO AUDIT REPORT, supra note 276, at ¶ 41. 
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and every dollar the IRS spent on auditing small corporations would result in an 
additional $2 of collected revenue. Of course, these numbers do not account for 
the indirect effect of audits on voluntary compliance.298 They also are not current. 
In particular, they pre-date IRS reform and the accompanying restructuring of the 
IRS along taxpayer lines. However, more recent numbers do not appear to be 
available.299
These figures also do not account for diminishing marginal returns because 
the IRS attempts to prioritize the returns most likely to produce additional 
revenue.300 However, the current level of enforcement by SB/SE is quite low. In 
the 2001 fiscal year, SB/SE’s examination coverage in the non-Industry Case 
program, which represents most of its examinations, was .07%.301 In that 
program, examination coverage of individuals by SB/SE was .05% for fiscal year 
2001.302 At the beginning of fiscal year 2002, taxpayers were moved from the 
Large and Mid-Sized Business Division to SB/SE,303 presumably increasing its 
workload. These facts, coupled with the reality that the rate of audit of the self-
employed has declined over time304 suggests that an increase in enforcement 
would increase the amount of tax collected. 
 
298 Studies have estimated the voluntary compliance return on enforcement at 
approximately 6 to 11 times the direct return on enforcement. See supra note 195 and 
accompanying text.  
299 In fact, numbers relating to audits started after the IRS was restructured probably 
would not yet be valuable because there would not have been enough time to ascertain what 
portion of dollars recommended after audit would actually be collected. 
300 According to a New York Times article, “Last year, the agency pursued just one in six 
cases in which it found discrepancies [in information return matching], down from four in six 
cases in 1997.” David Cay Johnston, A Smaller I.R.S. Gives Up on Billions in Back Taxes, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 13, 2001, at 1. TRAC IRS reports that “[f]or business returns reporting gross 
receipts of more than $100,000 there was a three-fold decline” in the rate of audit between 1992 
and 2001.  Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, at http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/findings/ 
aboutIRS/irsTrends.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2003). The audit rate of businesses with assets 
under $10 million was 1.57% in the 1995 fiscal year, 1.88% in 1996, 2.22% in 1997, 1.67% in 
1998, 1.16% in 1999, .77% in 2000, and .60% in 2001. IRS Progress Report, supra note 77, at 
43. 
301 2002 Management Advisory Report, supra note 262, at 30, 32. 
302 Id. This compares to examination coverage of .4% by the W&I division, where 
compliance is high. See 2001 Management Advisory Report, supra note 251, at 5. Examination 
staffing in SB/SE was down approximately 7% in 2001. Treasury Inspector General for Tax 
Administration Office of Audit Fiscal Year 2003 Annual Audit Plan, Doc. 10932 at 11 (rev. 9-
2002). 
303 See supra note 276. 
304 The rate of audits for individual returns filed with a Schedule C was 4.13% in fiscal 
year 1995, 3.60% in 1996, 3.15% in 1997, 2.35% in 1998, 2.02% in 1999, 1.55% in 2000, and 
1.60% in 2001. See IRS Data Books, Fiscal Years 1995–2001, Tables 11 and 12 (percentages 
calculated by the author). 
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 In addition to increasing enforcement, the IRS might consider having the 
SB/SE Division send letters to that segment of taxpayers informing those 
taxpayers about a compliance initiative focusing on cash-based businesses. The 
Minnesota Experiment found that “high-risk” taxpayers, which included those 
who had filed a federal schedule C and paid Minnesota estimated taxes, were 
positively influenced by the audit letter.305 If the IRS succeeded in tipping this 
segment of taxpayers to a compliance norm, it could follow up with a compliance 
norm letter at that point. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Tax noncompliance is a complex issue with a multitude of causes. The 
traditional response to noncompliance is enforcement, and the intuitive prediction 
provided by economic modeling that increased audit rates and higher sanctions 
each increase tax compliance has been confirmed by a number of studies. In 
addition, innovative research by the governments of Minnesota and Australia 
suggest that compliance can be influenced by reports to taxpayers that compliance 
is higher than many people think it is. 
Although enforcement of the tax laws by the IRS and fostering of a 
compliance norm are sometimes viewed as inconsistent, the evidence suggests 
that enforcement does not undermine compliance norms. Enforcement not only 
produces direct revenue, but also increases revenue from “voluntary” compliance. 
That means that, even if theoretically, enforcement were to have a positive 
compliance effect in terms of deterrence and a negative effect with respect to 
compliance norms, overall enforcement increases voluntary compliance. 
Moreover, enforcement does not seem to be inconsistent with efforts to foster 
a compliance norm. Laboratory experiments suggest that the availability of costly 
punishments in public goods games increases cooperation. In addition, because 
taxpayers are heterogeneous, it is likely that some taxpayers respond better to 
enforcement and some to normative appeals. The Minnesota study found that to 
be the case.306 Another study found that those taxpayers who believed that there 
was a higher likelihood that small tax cheaters would be detected had a lower 
 
305 See supra text accompanying notes 204–06. “High-risk” taxpayers were defined as 
taxpayers who filed a federal schedule C (for business income) or F (for farm income) in 1993 
and who paid Minnesota estimated taxes in 1993. Coleman, supra note 34, at 2. Surprisingly, 
the audit letter seemingly had no effect on taxpayers who reported 1993 rental income, income 
from farming, income from a partnership, or income from an S corporation. Id. at 21. There was 
minimal overlap in the two groups (with respect to those who received farm income, filed a 
Schedule F, and paid estimated taxes). E-mail from Leandra Lederman, Professor of Law, 
George Mason University School of Law, to Steve Coleman, Adjunct Professor, Metropolitan 
State University, Doctoral Faculty, Graduate School of Public Administration, Hamline 
University (on file with author). 
306 See supra notes 207–09 and accompanying text. 
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belief in the normative acceptability of underreporting compared to other 
taxpayers.307
Taken together, these results support the theory that, because of the presence 
of taxpayers who are “conditional cooperators,” there may be two stable 
equilibria for taxpayer communities: compliance and noncompliance. The IRS 
can tailor appropriate compliance efforts accordingly. Thus, for example, with 
respect to the highly compliant taxpayers under the jurisdiction of the W&I 
Division, the IRS can continue to use high levels of document matching and low 
levels of audits, perhaps combined with a letter informing taxpayers that 
compliance is higher than they might think. In contrast, where evasion is a major 
problem, as it is with respect to the cash-based businesses under the jurisdiction of 
the SB/SE Division, the IRS can increase enforcement to the tipping point for a 
compliance equilibrium. At that point, norms-based appeals should have more 
force. 
 
307 See Smith, supra note 78; supra text accompanying note 191. 
